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Lords of Democracy: The Judicialization of
"Pure Politics" in the United States and
Germany
Russell A. Miller*

"Formyself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic
Guardians, even if] knew how to choose them, which I assuredlydo not.",
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I Introduction
The pitched legal struggle for the United States Presidency that raged for
thirty-six days after the November 7, 2000 election, culminating in the United
States Supreme Court's five-to-four decision awarding Texas Governor George
W. Bush the Presidency on December 12, 2000,2 left me feeling deeply
2. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam) (halting the recount ordered by the
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dissatisfied. Completely independent of the result of the Court's intervention, a
more generalized concern for a democratic process pursuant to which five
judges could pick the President contrary to the will of a narrow but clear
popular electoral majority has nagged me. In fact, because I was living in
Germany at the time of the election and its legal aftermath, my concern was
anything but rhetorical. German colleagues and friends routinely asked me,
with motives ranging from sincere curiosity to piety, to explain what the
Supreme Court had done and what it meant in the democratic scheme of things.
3
These questions were justified. Indeed, what kind of democracy is that?
This Article is my attempt to answer to that question. Along with
Richard Pildes's query,4 this piece is also conceived as a reply to Frank
Michelman's questions: "Princes forjudges. Is that what Americans want?
Would that be keeping the faith?"' It is, as well, a consideration of the claim
Mark Tushnet and Ran Hinschl pressed that Bush v. Gore manifests a6
"nascent phenomenon extending judicialization to the electoral arena itself."
Importantly, these are questions the relevance of which the recent election
cases arising out of the 2002 New Jersey United States Senate race 7 and the
2003 California gubernatorial recall8 kept alive. Fittingly, my analysis has
led me to reflect on Germany's constitutional response to contested
elections.9 I begin by accepting the democratic dualism marked out by the

Florida Supreme Court based on a violation of Equal Protection principles).
3. Richard H. Pildes framed the question more eloquently by referring to the operating
"normative ideals of democracy," the prevailing "cultural vision of democratic politics," and the
sustaining "images of democracy." Richard H.Pildes, Democracyand Disorder,in THE VOTE:
BUSH, GORE AND THE SUPREME COURT 140, 142 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds.,
2001 ) [hereinafter THE VOTE].
4. See supra note 3 (discussing the Richard Pildes Article).
5. Frank I. Michelman, Suspicion, or the New Prince,in TE VoTE, supra note 3, at 123,
139.
6.

Mark Tushnet, RenormalizingBush v. Gore: An Anticipatory IntellectualHistory, 90

GEo. L.J. 113, 125 n.68 (2001).
7. N.J. Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson, 814 A.2d 1028 (N.J. 2002), stay denied,
Forrester v. New Jersey Democratic Party, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 67 (2002) (mem.). See generally
David L. Evans, Jr., N.J. Democratic Party,Inc. v. Samson, 32 STETSON L. REv. 897 (2003).
8. See generally Southwest Voter Registration Educ. Project v. Shelley, 344 F.3d 914
(9th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
9. As the title of this Article suggests, it will consider the phenomenon ofjudicialization
as an explanation for the Supreme Court's decisive intervention in Bush v. Gore. Comparative
analysis is a common method for contemplating the parameters and meaning ofjudicialization.
See John Ferejohn, JudicializingPolitics,PoliticizingLaw, LAW & CONTEMp.PROBS., Summer
2002, at 41,56 ("[Hypotheses explaining judicialization] can be evaluated with either domestic
or comparative information.").
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terms "law" and "politics."'0 I invoke these opposing concepts with the terms
"judicialization 'til and "popularism.' 2 I clarify these concepts and the
dialectic they represent more fully in Part II. Roughly summarized,
judicialization occurs when shifts in the balance of power between law and
politics favor judicial institutions over representative and accountable
institutions. 3 From this basic dualism, this Article argues that the Supreme
Court's decision in Bush v. Gore14 constitutes a dramatic and unique
judicialization of American democracy. In Part HI, this Article introduces the
10. "Figuring out an acceptable relationship between law and politics has been one ofthe
perennial preoccupations of both politicians and lawyers, and of political scientists and legal
scholars as well." Christopher H. Schroeder, Foreword: The Law of Politics,LAw&CoNmEMP.
PROBS., Summer 2002, at 1, 1. Perhaps this relationship is what Frank Michelman meant when
speaking of "two clashing commitments: constitutionalism and democracy." Frank I.
Michelman, Brennan and Democracy, 86 CAL. L. REv. 399, 399 (1998). Michelman defines the
fault-line like this:
"Constitutionalism" appears to mean something like this: The containment of
politics by a supervening law that stands beyond the reach of the politics it is meant
to contain-a "law of lawmaking," we may call it-that controls which further laws
can be made and by what procedures. "Democracy" appears to mean something
like this: Popularpoliticalself-government-the people of a country deciding for
themselves the contents of the laws that organize and regulate their political
association.
Id. at 400 (emphasis added).
11. "[T]he infusion ofjudicial decision-making and of court-like procedures into political
arenas where they did not previously reside." Torbj~m Vallinder, When the Courts Go
Marching In, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER 13, 13 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjom
Vallinder eds., 1995); see also Ferejohn, supra note 9, at 41 (defining judicialization as the shift
of power from legislatures to courts). See generally ON LAW, POLITICS, & JUDICIALIZATION
(Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2002) (discussing the historical growth and impact of
judicialization globally). The term is interchangeable with "juristocracy", which presumes
judicialization and the subsequent preeminence of the judiciary in policy-making. See Ran
Hirschl, The Struggle for Hegemony: Understanding Judicial Empowerment through
Constitutionalization in Culturally Divided Polities, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 73, 75 (2000) (noting
that the definition of juristocracy assumes policy-making by the judiciary through judicial
review); Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L. J. 1493, 1500-01 (1988)
(representing the concept ofjudicialization with the phrase "a government of the people by
laws") (emphasis added).
12. Again, as per Michelman, a "government of the people by thepeople." Michelman,
supra note 11, at 1500-01(emphasis added).
13. In this sense, perhaps I am pathologically interested in "the normative aspects of the
relationship between the courts and the [powers and responsibilities of] elected branches."
Comell W. Clayton, The Supply and Demand Sides ofJudicial Policy-Making (Or, Why Be So
Positive About the Judicialization ofPolitics?), LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2002, at 69,
76 (citing Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of
ConstitutionalScholarship,95 Nw. U. L. REv. 933 (2001)). Admitting the disease, however, is
the first step to being cured.
14. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
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Supreme Court's Bush v. Gore decision and the German Federal Constitutional
Court's decision in the Hessen Wahlprifung Entscheidung (Hessen Election
Review Case).' 5 Because these cases involved the review of contested elections
and the respective courts decided them only a few months apart, they serve as
parallel constitutional moments for examining this constitutional development in
a comparative context. 16 In both cases, the courts preferred judicial over
alternative, if not constitutionally mandated, political mechanisms for resolving
the respective election challenges. The context of these cases, in the sphere of
what this article terms "pure politics,"' is of unique democratic import and serves
as the crux of the Article's thesis. It is here, with respect to this distinct sphere of
the democratic process, in which the forces of judicialization and popularism
come directly and most perilously into conflict: The judiciary acted in both of
these cases to seize the very apparatus that led to the selection of a candidate or
the success of a political party in a specific election. Here we are concerned with
a far more meaningful imposition on popularist values than that posed byjudicial
review of legislation which is widely treated as the sine qua non of
judicialization, is or even other "indirect" forms ofjudicial engagement of the "law
15. Entscheidangen Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] [Federal Constitutional Court]
103, 111 (F.R.G.). Also published at 14 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFr 1048 (2001) and
available online as BVerfG, 2 BvF 1/00 vom 08.02.2001, Para.-Nr. (I - 123), at
http://www.bverfg.de.antacheidungen/frames/fs20010208_2bvfOOl0
(last visited Nov. 15,
2003) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In this Article, the case will be
referred to as the Hessen Election Review Case.
16. Bruce Ackerman proposes consideration of "constitutional moments" when thinking
about constitutional transformation and development. See, e.g., 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: TRASSFORMATIONS 4-8 (1998) (positing that there are specific periods of time in
American history that have uniquely defined the scope and role of the Constitution in American
politics); Bruce Ackerman, HigherLawmaking, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: T)E THEORY
AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 63, 84-87 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995)
(arguing that true change in constitutional legitimacy and meaning comes not through
amendment but through popular constitutional upheaval).
17. See Elizabeth Garrett, Leaving the Decision to Congress, in THE VOTE, supra note 3,
at 38, 39 (explaining that the 2000 election crisis was best suited to resolution in the legislature
or public forum because of its uniquely political nature).
18. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT
(2001) (approaching judicial review as the driving force of contemporary judicialization of
society); SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 9 (1990)

(arguing that law has become uniquely political, especially when addressing political acts like
legislation). Snowiss states:
Judicial exposition of the law of the Constitution, operating as part of a legal check
on unconstitutional legislation, generates a policy-making that, unlike that of
ordinary law, conflicts with the requirements of democracy and opens judicial
review to the charges of judicial supremacy and invasion of the legislative
sphere... what Professor Bickel has called constitutional law's "countermajoritarian" difficulty.
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of democracy."' 19 Whatever case might be made for the propriety, necessity, or
inherence of a judicial role in "the political thicket" 20 in these contexts, it is
altogether another thing to have the courts settling elections, and in so doing,
picking the people's representatives. In Part IV, this Article argues, based on a
consideration of the distinct constitutional traditions out of which these cases
arose, that the shift the Supreme Court accomplished signals a radical,
ideologically driven convergence with Germany's comprehensivelyjudicialized
treatment of pure politics.
III The Judicializationof Pure Politics
A. Judicializationof Society
Gunther Teubner and others 2I have expertly chronicled and critiqued the
most recent "thrust 2 2 in the unfolding judicialization of society that is the

1d. (footnote omitted).
19. The title of the excellent casebook on the subject of the "complex interaction between

democratic politics and the formal institutions of the state." SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE
LAW OF DEMOCRACY 1 (1998). Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes consider the expanding
engagement of the judiciary with the structural institutions of democracy in their casebook,
including, inter alia: "the right to participate," "the reapportionment revolution," "the role of
political parties," "redistricting and representation," "money and politics," and "alternative
democratic structures." Id. at xii-xv; see also Ferejohn, supra note 9, at 61 (documenting the
increased interaction between counts and the institution of the democratic process). Ferejohn
notes:
Recent legal regulation of democratic practices has focused on developing
constitutional doctrines that permit courts to reshape political practices.
Apportionment, access to the ballot box, campaign finance, and other modes of
regulating political life, long shielded from judicial scrutiny by the political
question doctrine, came under increasing pressure in the post-World War 11period.
Id.
20. Justice Frankfurter warned against the Court wandering deeper into the "political
thicket" in dealing with legislative redistricting. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,556 (1946).
21.

See generally ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES:

CONSTITUTIONAL

POLITICS IN EUROPE 1 (2000); John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Rule of DemocracyandRule
ofLaw, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW (Jose Maria Maravall & Adam Przeworski eds.,
2002) (documenting the tension between the political and judicial processes and arguing for a
distinction between democracy and law).
22. Habermas depicted the history ofjuridification as four great thrusts: the bourgeois
state, the bourgeois constitutional state, the democratic constitutional state, and the social
welfare state. See Jorgen Habermas, Law as Medium and Law as Institution,in DILEMMAS OF
LAW rN THE WELFARE STATE

203,205-209 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1985) (analyzing the growth

ofjudicialization in Europe).
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consequence of the modem welfare state." Building upon the work of
Habermas, Teubner has traced the legal "colonization of the life world;, 24 the
law's capture of social relationships behind the restive expansion of the acutely
regulated modem welfare state.2" Along with the "materialization" aspect of
judicialization, which he finds dominant in this most recent thrust and therefore
of preeminent consideration,2 6 Teubner also admits the significance of various
27
(though lesser) aspects ofjudicialization, including: the proliferation of law,
29
2
the judicial expropriation of conflict, and the depoliticization of society.

The ascendancy of legal institutions, particularly the judiciary but also
more broadly "the medium of legal discourse, 3 ° is an inevitable and obvious
consequence of judicialization in each of these forms. 31 For example, in
23. See, e.g., Gunther Teubner, Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in
JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987) (outlining the opposition to
the growth ofjudicialization and offering ways to deal with the current expansion).
24. Id. at 24 (quoting Jalrgen Habermas, Law as Medium and Law as Institution, in
DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE STATE 203, 203 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1986)).
25. See id., at I I ("Firstly, the wider historical context ofjuridification becomes clear, [sic]
[in] the context of the development of the modem welfare state.").
26. See id. at 14 ("The trend towards juridification in welfare states, which expresses itself
in the materialization of formal law characterizes large numbers oflegal control interventions in
areas classically regarded as self-regulating in the world of industry and labor." (citation
omitted)).
27. See id. at 7 ("Juridification processes should in fact be analysed in terms of the
specific conditions of the modem social state, 'the interventionist state.' This at the same time
excludes the law-centered and lawyer-centered perspective of the 'flood of norms' school,
which concentrates exclusively on the legal material as such.").
28. See id. at 7-8 ("Sociologists of law describe juridification as a process in which
human conflicts are torn through formalization out of their living context and distorted by being
subjected to legal processes.").
29. See id. at 9 ("Yet on the other [hand], the repressive character ofluridification tends to
depoliticize social conflicts by drastically limiting the labor unions' possibilities of militant
action." (citation omitted)).
30. Alec Stone Sweet, ConstitutionalPolitics in France and Germany, in ON LAW,
POLITICS, & JUDICIALIZATION 184, 187 (Martin Shapiro & Alec Stone Sweet eds., 2002).
31. Habermas noted this tendency as central to thejuridificationprocess: "[Juridification]
heightens the problem of the separation of power, i.e. of the relation between the functionally
differentiated state institutions of legislature, executive andjudiciary. Within the constitutional
state this problem was posed only in the relationship between executive and judiciary."
Habermas, supra note 22, at 207. See generallyJURGEN HABERMAS, FAKTIZTAT UND GELTUNG:
BEITRAGE ZUR DISKURSTHEORIE DES RECHTS UND DES DEMOKRATISCHEN RECHTSSTAATS (2d ed.
1992); Helmuth Schulze-Fielitz, Rechtsprechende Gewalt (Artikel 92) in GRUNDGESETZ
KOMMENTAR, BAND II, [The Courts (Article 92)] 353, 362 (Horst Dreier ed., 2000) ("Der
ubiquitAre Proze!3 der Verrechtlichung in der modemen Industriegesellschaft hat gleichzeitig zu
einer Justizialisierung nicht nur des staatlichen Handelns, sondem aller gesellschaftlichen
Beziehungen gefllhrt .
[..."
(The ubiquitous process ofjuridification in the modem industrial
society has, at the same time, led to ajudicialization, not only in matters of the state, but in all
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describing the judicialization of the family and education in the context of the
modem welfare state, Habermas pleaded for the dejudicialization of these
spheres, in which a dysfunctional (that is, inappropriately situated) judiciary
intervenes to formalize family and educational conflicts and interactions.3 2
Commentators now broadly accept the overweening role of the judiciary in a
judicialized society 3 as our reality, 34 and commentary on judicialization
social relationships ... ."] (author's translation)).
32. See Habermas, supra note 22, at 216-20 (arguing that the judiciary should not attempt
to resolve family or educational disputes because of their personal nature). Habermas explains:
Nevertheless, the intuition that underlies the paradoxical proposal to de-judicialize
juridified family conflict is instructive: the juridification of communicatively
structured areas of action ought not to go beyond the enforcement of principles of
the rule of law; beyond the legal institutionalization of its external construction, be
it of the family or of the school.
Id. at 217-18. Habermas also notes: "Controlled by the judiciary and the administration, the
school changes inperceptibly into a welfare institution that organizes and distributes schooling
as a social benefit." Id. at 219.
33. Vallinder, supra note I1, at 13 ("[T]he infusion of judicial decision-making and of
courtlike procedures into political arenas where they did not previously reside.").
34. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (accepting as a
premise that judges have adopted judicialization of social spheres as a reality); THE GLOBAL
EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate & Torbj6m Vallinder eds., 1995) (discussing the
growth of global judicialization through cooperative analysis); SWEET, supra note 21 (positing
that parliamentary supremacy has died at the hands of constitutional interpretation in the
courts); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) (arguing
that the Constitution is in the province of all and that the courts should no longer be treated as
the final arbiter of its meaning). This Article's use of the word "our" in this context is meant to
be broadly, even globally inclusive, and neither patronizing nor Western/Northem-centric. The
contributors to Tate and Vallinder's text:
[F]ind judicialization present or developing in a wide variety of places. Though not
all are treated here, Canada, France, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Malta, the
Phillippines, Sweden, the United States, Latin America, the former USSR, and the
European Community (at least) all appear to be settings in which the expansion of
judicial power/judicialization of politics is relevant, even controversial.
C. Neal Tate, Why the Expansion of JudicialPower, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL
POWER 27, 27 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjdrn Vallinder eds., 1995). Alec Stone Sweet has at least
confirmed thejudicialization of European polities as well as the supra-national European Union:
"In a word, European policy-making has been judicialized." SWEET, supra note 21, at 1; see
also Ferejohn, supra note 9, at 41 (explaining the evidence indicating a shift of power to the
courts). Ferejohn states:
Since World War II, there has been a profound shift in power away from
legislatures and toward courts and other legal institutions around the world. This
shift, which has been called "judicialization" has become more or less global in its
reach, as evidenced by the fact that it is as marked in Europe, and especially
recently in Eastern Europe, as it is in the United States.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Hirschl, supra note 11, at 73 ("Over the past two decades the
constitutionalization of rights, the establishment of judicial review, and the judicialization of
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typically focuses on the appropriate division of policy-making authority within
the modem welfare state. 35 That is to say, the concern is with the
judicialization of politics or the shift of policy-making authority from the
political (popularist) branches (that is, the legislative and, in some systems, the
executive) to the unaccountable, unrepresentative judiciary.3 6
B. Judicializationand the Decline of Popularism
It is here, on the preference given to or the power taken by the judiciary
with respect to the distribution of policy-making authority among the
competing branches of the modem welfare state that this Article concentrates.
It is a perspective Teubner invites; 37 his term "depoliticization" can be read to
politics have achieved aworldwide expansion ofjudicial power."); Herbert Jacob, Introduction,
in COURTS, LAW, AND POLITICS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 1, 1 (Herbert Jacob et al. eds.,
1996) ("In this book we seek to demonstrate that the intersection of law, courts, and politics is
not a uniquely American phenomenon. It is ubiquitous.").
35. See generally ON LAW, POLITICS, & JUDICIALIZATION, supra note I I (discussing,
through a series of essays, the proper role ofjudicial review and its impact on social legislation
and policy).
36. See Clayton, supra note 13, at 76 (reviewing the current state of the scholarship on
judicialization and its almost exclusive focus on how power has been given to thejudiciary and
through what means). Clayton argues that the normative question about the role of the judiciary
in a democracy diminishes in importance when one confronts the empirical evidence that the
"courts use their power to reinforce, rather than to thwart, the political agenda of the elected
branches." Id. He joins John Ferejohn in arguing that the more relevant analysis would
consider "the structural-institutional features permitting judicial policy-making generally." Id.
at 74; see also SWEET, supra note 21, at I ("Parliamentary supremacy, understood by most
students of European politics to be a constitutive principle of European politics, has lost its
vitality."); Ran Hirschl, Looking Sideways, Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards: Judicial
Review vs. Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 415, 421 (2000)
("[Critics ofjudicialization] question the legitimacy of transferring important policy-making
prerogatives from elected and accountable politicians, parliaments, and other majoritarian
decision-making bodies to the judiciary."). Habermas and Teubner were well aware of this
tension above the surface but were compelled to delve deeper, to the roots of the matter. See
generally Habermas, supra note 22 (discussing judicialization as it pertains to family and
education); Teubner, supra note 23 (analyzing judicialization within the broader social welfare
state and offering ways to deal with its impact).
37. Tuebner, supra note 23, at 27 (arguing that a consequentialist approach to the problem
ofjuridification is appropriate). Tuebner explains:
There is no "solution" of the regulatory trilemma in sight. As already stated, the
phenomenon ofjuridification as such is a partial aspect of societal evolution and
cannot therefore be effectively reversed by delegalization strategies. The only
approaches which can be taken seriously are those which seek to deal with the
dysfunctional consequences resulting from juridificaiton.
Id. Perhaps more significantly, neither Habermas nor Teubner portrays juridification as
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indicate the tension between judicialization and popularism. 38 Stated another
way, judicialization describes both the outward-looking colonization of the
"lifeworld" by the law and the judiciary's accompanying rise to supremacy
among the law's institutions.39 This characterization necessarily raises the
questions of legitimacy and of the vitality of the democratic gains achieved in
Habermas's third historic thrust ofjudicialization (the democratic constitutional
state), gains which he specifically associated with popularist
mechanisms like
"parliamentary will-formation and public discussion., 40
Judicialization may pose such a threat to democracy's inherently
popularist values when it involves the judiciary overstepping the positive and
perhaps even necessary, popularist delimitation in order to assert its inherently
"counter-majoritarian"' 4 power where the majority should prevail. 42 Even
worse, in terms of antipopularist consequences, is judicial involvement in
which the minority should prevail based on justice or rights 43 and the majority
would have reached that result of its own accord without judicial
involvement."4 Finally, judicial involvement must also be characterized as
exclusively unprogressive in spite of their call to reclaim the "lifeworld" for a more deliberative,
more democratic social existence. See Habermas, supra note 22, at 218 ("The place of law as a
medium must be replaced by procedures for settling conflicts that are appropriate to the
structures of action oriented towards communication-discursive processes of will-formation
and consensus-oriented procedures of negotiation and decision-making."); Teubner, supra note
23, at 39 ("The necessary consequence of the social phenomenon of self-reference and selfproclamation is the adjustment of legal theory and legal practice to such concepts."). The claim
that juridification has had some progressive impact is based on Habermas's and Teubner's
concession that the third of Habermas's historic thrusts of juridification involved the
"democratization of the constitutionalized power of the state," significantly in the interest of
labor, among others. Teubner, supra note 23, at 11; see also Habermas, supra note 22, at 207

("Constitutionalized state power was democratized and the citizens ... were provided with
rights of political participation.").

38. Teubner, supra note 23, at 9-10.
39. The model depends on the principle of separation of powers. "Mainstream
comparative politics scholarship often portrays the expansion ofjudicial power through judicial
review as analogous to the separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches because of its tendency to 'diffuse power and add veto points."' Hirschl, supra note
11, at 76 (footnote omitted) (quoting R.Kent Weaver & Bert A. Rockman, Assessing the Effects
ofInstitutions, in Do INSTITUTIONS MATTER? GovERNMENT CAPABILITIES INTHE UNITED STATES
AND ABROAD 1,32 (R. Kent Weaver & Bert A. Rockman eds., 1993)).
40. Habermas, supra note 22, at 207.
41. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962).
42.

Judicialization, in the form ofjudicial review, often serves the important democratic

goal of protecting the rights of minorities against the caprice of the majority.
43. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 51 (1999) ("[T]here is even greater injustice if
these already disadvantaged are also arbitrarily treated in particular cases where the rules would

give them some security.").
44. In fact, some argue that the judiciary seldom reaches much beyond the interests of the
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antipopularist when it reaches the "wrong" result while the majority would have
reached a similarly (or at least not dramatically different) "wrong" result. These
points form the antipopularist core ofjudicialization. Beyond the questions
concerned with which interests should prevail on any given issue, lies the
question of which institution should act to reach the result: the people through
their elected and accountable representatives or the unaccountable and
unrepresentative judiciary? 45 Judicialization favors the latter.
C. The Judicializationof PurePolitics
What then is at stake when the law of democracy falls prey to
judicialization? Accepting the definition Issacharoff and others provided that
the law of democracy refers to the "pre-existing laws, rules, and institutions"
that govern the process of collective decision-making in a democratic political
order,46 the judicialization of this sphere raises the possibility "that in the name
of liberal constitutionalism, active judicial review may destroy the most
important political right that citizens in liberal democracies possess: the right
to participation and self-government. '47 Issacharoff and others explain:
When courts become central players [in the democratic process itself] that
will raise some of the most difficult questions about institutional role in all
of constitutional theory. On the other hand, courts will become embroiled
in partisan, political struggles, not over specific enactments, but over the
very olitical framework through which the electorate exercises its political
will.
Judicialization of the law of democracy, understood as an antipopularist
process, is a threat because it inappropriately elevates an unaccountable and
unrepresentative institution above accountable and representative institutions in
the policy-making process.49 Judicial appropriation of the "democratic

prevailing majority, and when it does so, it is considerably less effective than the political

branches.
45.

The answer to the second question draws upon Tushnet's analysis, which concludes

that both systems are flawed. See generally TusHNEr, supra note 34.
46. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 19, at 1.
47. Id. at 2.
48. Id.
49. See id. (debating the role of the courts in the political process and the need to prevent
the courts from taking too great a role in pure political issues). See generallyTUsHNET, supra
note 34.
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institutional design,"' which establishes the parameters of the electorate's
political role and identity, compounds the dangers inherent in this maneuver.
The judicialization of pure politics raises even more urgent questions.
Pure politics refers to actual, outcome specific electoral decision-making as
opposed to the outcome-neutral engagement of the structures of democracy.
Elizabeth Garrett noted the essence of pure politics and the gravity of the
Supreme Court's intrusion thereupon in Bush v. Gore:
[A]lthough the Court has entered the political thicket frequently ....
[U]sually, the Court's ruling benefits large groups of candidates or political
actors. For example, in the campaign finance area, the Court's
jurisprudence arguably benefits incumbents relative to challengers, or the
independently wealthy relative to middle- and lower-income Americans.
The blanket primary decision favors more extreme candidates over more
moderate ones. Rarely does the Court actuallyknow that its decision will
result in the immediate election of one or the other individual who is a

party in the case.5

Sanford Levinson also draws out the meaning of pure politics in his
reaction to the Court's decision in Bush v. Gore, stressing:
[O]ne must realize exactly how far removed from any Rawlsian "veil of
ignorance" the Court was in December 2000. They not only knew the
identity of the specific presidential candidate who would benefit from their
decisions; they also knew the outcome of the elections with regard to the
House of Representatives and the Senate of the United States.
This context, not the question of how democratic institutions should be
structured but rather what the outcome of the implementation of those
structures should be, is a sphere of pure politics in which courts should never
tread. The legitimacy of carving such a preserve for the realm ofpure politics,
perhaps limited to the act of electing representatives in a republic or
participating in a device of direct democracy (plebiscite or referendum), is
actually bolstered because both constitutional traditions under review here at
one time took the principle of parliamentary self-regulation for granted. 3
The judiciary should defer to pure politics, a concept that borrows from
the title of Hans Kelsen's work on a "Pure Theory of the Law,0 4 even at a time
50.
5 1.

ISSACHAROFFETAL.,supra note 19, at 20.
Garrett, supra note 17, at 44 (emphasis added).

52.

Sanford Levinson, Bush v. Gore and the FrenchRevolution: A TentativeList of Some

Early Lessons, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 2002, at 7, 22.
53. See infra Part IV (arguing that the shift evidenced in Bush v. Gore isjudicialization

taken too far).
54.

See generally HANs KELSEN, REINE RECHTSLEHRE (2d ed. 1960) (outlining "pure
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when the judicialization of politics has led to ever greater judicial
involvement in the democratic process. Pure politics should remain a final
preserve of traditional democratic principles, namely, that the policy-making
(in the case of direct democracy) or the representative and accountable
policy-making institutions (in the case of representative democracy) should
retain a close political connection to the people themselves.5" Whether a
mechanism like the American political question doctrine can adequately
protect the realm of pure politics seems doubtful in light of the j udicializing
tendencies revealed in the cases examined in this Article. It was, after all,
precisely into the realm of pure politics that the U.S. Supreme Court and the
German Federal Constitutional Court so willingly tread.
II1. Two Election Disputes, Two Victoriesfor Judicialization
The Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore and the Federal
Constitutional Court's Hessen Election Review Case represent significant
victories for judicialization over popularist alternatives. In both cases the
judicial branch, and especially the politically self-conscious but nonetheless
unrepresentative and unaccountable Supreme and Constitutional Courts,
emerged as the superior mechanism over and against parliamentary popularist
methods for resolving election disputes. The Supreme Court's intervention
thwarted the constitutional and statutory models for the resolution of the
Electoral College conflict that would have favored Congress. The model the
Hessen Constitution provided and that the Federal Constitutional Court
repudiated also sought to ensure a dominant role for the parliament in the
matter of election review.

theory of law"); Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law andAnalyticalJurisprudence,55 HARv.
L. REv. 44 (1941), reprintedin HANS KELSEN, WHAT IS JUSTICE? 266 (1957). Kelsen sought to
identify the "nature of law itself' by "preclude[ing] from the cognition of positive law all
elements foreign thereto." HANS KELSEN, WHAT ISJUSTICE? 266 (1957). The concept of pure
politics would concede the over-simplicity of claims for a strict separation of powers, while
insisting that, even in the face of the intermingling of governance in the modern welfare state,
there remain some acts that are purely political. See Ferejohn, supra note 9, at 47 (noting the
acceptance of the complexity theory of separation of powers) To paraphrase Kelsen: The
cognition of a realm of political action purely distinct from all elements of judicial and
administrative action. KELSEN, supra,at 266. Defining the contours of pure politics is a matter
for further consideration.
55. See Ferejohn, supra note 9, at 45 (arguing that there are substantive areas of law and
legislation that are best left to the branches of government most accountable to the people).
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A. The Supreme Court's Decision in Bush v. Gore
1. Background
The 2000 U.S. presidential election failed to produce an undisputed
winner by the end of Election Day, November 7, 2000.56 The outcome of the
election was then, in turns, handed over to and sometimes seized by a variety of
institutional actors, leading to its ultimate resolution by the U.S. Supreme Court
in a five-to-four decision issued in the late hours of December 12, 2000." 7 In a
divisive election in which more than ninety-six million Americans voted,58
much was actually quite clear in the first days following the election. After a
dramatic night of slipshod forecasting from the television networks and a roller
coaster exchange of zero-hour concessions and retractions,5 9 it was clear that
the Democratic candidate, Vice President Al Gore, had won a slight but secure
victory over Republican George W. Bush in the nationwide popular vote. 6°
The states that Vice President Gore had safely taken, or in which he looked
certain to emerge as winner after less intensely contested election review
proceedings, provided him with a solid lead in the Electoral College count.6'
56.

See Richard L. Banke, Outcome Hangs on Contested FloridaVote, in 36 DAYS: THE

2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CRISIS 1, 1-3 (Correspondents of
THE N.Y. TIMES eds., 2001) [hereinafter 36 Days] (noting that Florida's popular vote was
unresolved the day after the polls closed and that a count of the overseas ballots might be
necessary to determine a winner).
57. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam) (resolving the Equal Protection
challenge to the manual ballot recount ordered by the Florisa Supreme Court). The Court issued
its opinion at 10:00 p.m. Linda Greenhouse, A Deeply DividedCourt Ends the Struggle, in 36
DAYS, supra note 56, at 304.
58. Richard L. Berke, Bush Leads Gore by 1,784 Votes as Recount Begins, in 36 DAYS,
supra note 56, at 8.
59. During their election-night coverage, the national television networks declared the
decisive states of Michigan and Florida for Vice President Gore at 8:00 p.m. They retreated
from that projection a few hours later, labeling Florida too close to call at 10:00 p.m. At 2:00
a.m. on the morning of November 8, 2001, the networks completed their reversal of the initial
projection and declared Florida for Bush. At 4:00 a.m., with the uncertainty in Florida
prevailing, the networks finally conceded that the result in Florida would have to wait for the
official tally. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED 18-20 (2001) (outlining the
media's failed attempts to declare a winner of the presidential race of 2000).
60. Ultimately, the margin of Vice President Gore's victory in the nationwide popular
vote would be 539,897 votes. See id.
at 170 (documenting the final 2000 election popular vote
differential); A Popular Vote Edgefor Gore, in 36 DAYS, supra note 56, at 319 (same).
61. The dispute over the outcome of the 2000 election came to focus on Florida in spite of
the fact that Electoral College slates of Oregon, Iowa, and New Mexico would be awarded on
the basis of extremely narrow popular election margins. See A Popular Vote Edgefor Gore,
supra note 60, at 319; GILLMAN, supra note 59, at 19 (observing that it was assumed that Florida
would determine the 2000 election even with close votes in other states). New Mexico's
COMPLETE CHRONICLE OF THE

LORDS OF DEMOCRACY
The only thing that was not resolved turned out to be the determinative
outcome of the popular election in Florida. 62 The winner of the Florida popular
election, awarded Florida's slate of twenty-five Electoral College votes, would
have the Electoral College majority and would be the President Elect.63 Over
the first few days following the election, Governor Bush's hair's-breadth lead
of 1,784 votes in Florida dwindled to an improbable 229 votes after the
conclusion of the statewide, automatic recounts necessitated by the narrowness
of the election result.64
Vice President Gore was emboldened by the extremely narrow result of
the Florida election and, no doubt to some degree, by the wave of concerns
Electoral College slate, for example, was ultimately awarded to Vice President Gore on the basis
of a 366-vote victory in the state, nearly 200 votes fewer than the final difference in Governor
Bush's favor in Florida. A PopularVote for Gore, supranote 60, at 319. The reason the battle
centered on Florida was, of course, Florida's bounteous and decisive Electoral College slate of
25 votes, a total of six votes more than Oregon (seven), Iowa (seven) and New Mexico (five)
combined. Id. With only Florida in dispute, Vice President Gore's 266 Electoral College votes
led Governor George W. Bush's 246. Id.
62. See Berke, supranote 58, at 1-3 (documenting the undetermined Florida popular vote
at the close of November 7, 2000).
63. See generally U.S. CONST. art. 11,§ 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner
as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of
Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress."). Two
Senators represent Florida like all other states. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl.
I. Based on the 1990
census, Florida's population of 13,003,362 was represented at the time of the 2000 Presidential
Election by twenty-three Representatives to the U.S. Congress. U.S. Census Bureau,
Apportionment and Apportionment Population Based on the 1990 Census (November 13,
2003), availableat http://www.census.gov/population/censusdata/apportionment/table-a.pdf.
There are atotal of435 Representatives and 100 Senators (538 total Electors including three for
the District of Columbia, U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § I) making 270 Electoral College votes
the bare majority necessary for an Electoral College victory. See Robin Toner, The Electoral
College Rears its Ugly Head, in 36 DAYS, supra note 56, at 24 ("The Electoral College is,
essentially, 538 people who elect the president and vice president, based on each state's popular
vote.").
64. See FLA. STAT. § 102.141(6) (2001) (old version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.141(4)
(2000)) (necessitating a recount). The old statute read:
If the unofficial returns reflect that a candidate for any office was defeated or
eliminated by one-half of a percent or less of the votes cast for such office, that a
candidate for retention to ajudicial office was retained or not retained by one-half
of a percent or less of the votes cast on the question of retention, or that a measure
appearing on the ballot was approved or rejected by one-half of a percent or less of
the votes cast on such measure, the board responsible for certifying the results of
the vote on such race or measure shall order a recount of the votes cast with respect
to such office or measure.
Id.; see also Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 73-76 (2000) (per
curiam) (discussing the automatic recount and the events immediately following it); GILLMAN,
supra note 59, at 20-21 (recounting the events of the election night and the actions of Bush and
Gore in the days following the election).
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about alleged improprieties and irregularities in the Florida election. 65 He then
"exercised his statutory right to submit written requests for manual recounts to
the canvassing board of any county."' 66 The Vice President's request for
manual recounts in four traditionally Democratic counties (Volusia, Palm
Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade) cast the tangled web of legal proceedings
that led to the Supreme Court's decision.
Vice President Gore fired the first legal volley, challenging Florida
Secretary of State Katherine Harris's authority over the county canvassing
boards, which would conduct a manual recount and submit final, countywide
tallies.67 Secretary Harris had interpreted Florida's election law as imposing a
strict seven-day deadline for the completion and submission of the results of the
canvassing boards' manual recount efforts. 6' The trial court upheld Harris's
discretion to enforce the seven-day deadline and the objectivity she employed
in that enforcement, on the most significant points, leading Vice President Gore
to appeal to the Florida Supreme Court.69 Meanwhile, the counties from which
65. See Don Van Natta Jr. & Dana Canedy, The Case of the "Butterfly" Ballot, in 36
supra note 56, at 10 (discussing how the confusing layout of the Palm Beach County
"butterfly" ballot may have led a significant number of voters who intended to vote for Vice
President Gore to cast their vote for Reform Party Candidate Patrick Buchanan); see also
GILLMAN, supra note 59, at 21 (describing the "butterfly" votes); David Gonzalez, AfricanAmericans Seek Inquiry into Florida Vote, in 36 DAYS, supra note 56, at 36-38 (addressing a
range of complaints from minority voters including improperly prepared voter registration lists,
understaffed polling stations, disproportionate negative impact in voting technology errors, and
suspicious police road-blocks near polling stations in minority neighborhoods).
66. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 73-74 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.166 (2000)).
67. Katherine Harris had also served as the cochair of Governor Bush's Florida campaign
committee. GILLMAN, supra note 59, at 31.
68. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 74 ("The Florida Circuit Court
ruled that the statutory 7-day deadline was mandatory, but that Volusia [county] board could
amend its return at a later date. The court further ruled that the Secretary ...could exercise her
discretion in deciding whether to include the late amended returns."). The statute read:
The county canvassing board or a majority thereof shall file the county returns for
the election of a federal or state officer with the Department of State immediately
after certification of the election results. Returns must be filed by 5 p.m. on the 7th
day following a primary election and by 5 p.m. on the 11 th day following the
general election. If the returns are not received by the department by the time
specified, such returns shall be ignored and the results on file at that time shall be
certified by the department.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.1 18(1)--3) (2002) (old version at FLA. STAT. § 102.1 12(l) (2000)); see
also GILLMAN, supra note 59, at 34 ("[Harris] began to warn those who were becoming hopeful
about recounts that state law required counties to submit their returns no later than one week
after the election.").
69. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 74 (discussing the procedural
posture leading up to the case); see also McDermott v. Harris, No. CV 00-2700 (Leon County
DAYS,
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Vice President Gore had requested a manual recount had either abandoned the
effort (Miami-Dade and Palm Beach), sent the results of a partial manual
recount in time to meet the deadline (Broward, though resolved to continue the
full manual recount after the deadline had passed), or met the deadline after a
full manual recount by a mere five minutes (Volusia). ° Vindicated by the trial
court and in keeping with her announced intention to enforce the seven-day
deadline for submitting returns, the Secretary certified the election results as
71
they stood on November 14, 2000, with Governor Bush leading by 300 votes.
On Vice President Gore's appeal, the Florida Supreme Court accepted
jurisdiction over the case and immediately vacated the Secretary of State's
certification of the state's vote.72 The Florida Supreme Court sought to resolve
two distinct issues: (1)whether the manual recounts proposed by the
canvassing boards, especially to the degree that they included "undervotes" in
the new tally, 73 were consistent with the election law's provision for manual
recounts as a result of an "error in vote tabulation; 7 4 and (2) how to resolve
conflicts in the Florida election law regarding the timing of the conduct and
submission of manual recounts as well as the Secretary of State's discretion to

Cir. Ct. filed November 14, 2000), overruledby Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris,
772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000), in BUSH v. GORE: THE COURT CASES AND THE COMMENTARY 19,
23 (E.J. Dionne Jr. & William Kristol eds., 2001) (upholding the Secretary's discretionary
authority to enforce the deadline, with the exception that she not pre-judge the certification of
any potentially late-filed returns from county canvassing boards).
70. GILLMAN, supra note 59, at 42-43.
71. Tracking Bush's Lead, in 36 DAYS, supra note 56, at 174.
72. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70,74-75 (2000) (per curiam).
73. See GILLMAN, supra note 59, at 24-25. Gillman wrote:
Undervotes referred to ballots in which a machine did not register a vote for any
candidate for a particular office. One reason for this result would be that the voter
chose not to express a preference for a particular office; but it was also possible that
a voter attempted to convey a preference but did not have that preference registered
because of some feature, limitation, or error associated with the vote-counting
machines. When a machine failed to register a vote that someone attempted to cast,
then that result might be more properly thought of as "undercounting" rather than
undervoting; at least this was the emergent view within the Gore campaign.
Id.
74. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 75; see Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1229 (Fla. 2000), vacatedsub nom. by Palm Beach
County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 78 ("The issue in dispute here is the meaning of the phrase
'error in the vote tabulation' found in section 102.166(5)."); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.166(5) (2000) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 102.166(5) (2002)) (describing the
procedure for manual recounting).
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accept or reject late-filed election returns (presumably delayed by a manual
recount).75
In a decision issued on November 21, 2000, the court unanimously
concluded, with respect to the first issue, that the legislative phrase "error in the
vote tabulation" justified the manual recounts the canvassing boards
proposed.76 As to the second issue, the court concluded that, among the
potentially conflicting provisions regarding the timing of the certification of
amended returns and the Secretary of State's discretion to accept or reject latefiled returns, Florida law neither precluded the late-filing of returns nor
empowered the Secretary to reject late-filed returns except when "the returns
are submitted so late that their inclusion will preclude a candidate from
contesting the certification or preclude Florida's voters from participating fully
in the federal electoral process. 7 7 In reaching this conclusion about the
controlling interpretation to give the relevant Florida statutory provisions, the
Florida Supreme Court declared that a resolve to honor and give force to "the
will of the voters" guided its decision. 78 The court also considered the
preeminence the Florida Constitution gives (of course, in the court's
interpretation of the constitution) to the right to vote.79 The Florida Supreme
Court, in light of its ruling, invoked its equitable powers and ordered all
amended election returns, following any manual recount, to be submitted to and
accepted by the Secretary by November 26, 2000.80
75. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 75; see Palm Beach County
CanvassingBd., 772 So. 2d at 1230 ("Having concluded that the county canvassing boards have

the authority to order countywide manual recounts, we must now determine whether the
Commission must accept a return after the seven-day deadline .. "); see also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 102.166 (2000) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 102.166 (2002)); § 102.111 (2000) (current
version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.111 (2002)) (describing the procedure for recounts in Florida);

§ 102.112 (2000) (current version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.112 (2002))
(detailing the deadlines for submission of county returns to the Secretary of State).
76. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d at 1230 (concluding that "the
county canvassing boards have the authority to order countywide manual recounts").
77. Id. at 1239.
78. Id. at 1228.
79. See id. at 1239 ("Because the right to vote is the preeminent right in the Declaration of
Rights of the Florida Constitution, the circumstances under which the Secretary may exercise
her authority to ignore acounty's returns filed after the initial statutory date are limited."); see,
e.g., FLA. CoNST. art. 1,§ I ("All political power is inherent in the people. The enunciation
herein of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by the people.").
80. Palm Beach County CanvassingBd., 772 So. 2d 1220, 1240 (Fla. 2000), vacated sub
nor. by Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam). The
Court noted that November 26, 2000 was a Sunday and extended the deadline for submission
and acceptance to Monday, November 27, 2000, in the event that the Secretary's office was not
open on November 26. Id.
FLA. STAT. ANN.
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Governor Bush appealed the Florida Supreme Court's decision to the U.S.
Supreme Court8' while the manual recounts Vice President Gore sought
resumed in various manifestations and under a range of standards.8 2 The
magnitude and complexity of the manual recount, further hampered by
orchestrated protests, 3 caused the process to bog down. Nonetheless, the
lurching recount effort produced hundreds of new votes for Vice President
Gore. Hours after the November 26, 2000 deadline that the Florida Supreme
Court had imposed, Secretary of State Harris certified Florida's vote for a
second time and for a second time declared Governor Bush the recipient of
Florida's
Electoral College slate, this time with an enhanced lead of 537
84
votes.

The U.S. Supreme Court, after an expedited briefing and hearing
schedule, issued a unanimous per curium decision on December 4, 2000.85 The
Court took pains to recognize its usual deference to state courts when
confronted with those courts' interpretation of state statutes.86 The Court
81. The Supreme Court granted Governor Bush's petition for writ of certiorari on
November 24, 2000. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 1004 (2000).
82. A literal carnival of controversies accompanied the recount effort as the campaigns

seemed to fight over every single vote. See Rick Bragg, A Recount Moment: Eatingthe Chads,

in 36 DAYS, supra note 56, at 105 (giving an account of the clash between Republicans and
Democrats involving the rough handling of the ballots); Dexter Filkins & Dana Canedy, Chaotic
ProtestInfluences Miami-Dade'sDecision, in 36 DAYS, supra note 56, at 134-35 (discussing

the protest orchestrated by Governor Bush's campaign that contributed to Miami-Dade County's
decision to give up the recount effort); David Firestone, Overseas Ballots Boost Bush Lead to
930, in 36 DAYS, supra note 56, at 101 (discussing the dispute over discarding some oversea
absentee ballots because of postmark dispute); Richard Pdrez-Pena, Military Ballots Merit a
Review, Lieberman Says, in 36 DAYS, supra note 56, at I I (discussing the disqualification of
39% of the absentee ballots from overseas and Lieberman's statement that Florida election
officials should reconsider those rejections); Richard Pdrez-Pena, Rancor Prevails in Debate
Over Military Votes, in 36 DAYS, supra note 56, at 101 (describing the dispute over letting
unpostmarked ballots in that most of the oversea absentee ballots came from military personnel);
Don Van Natta Jr., RepublicansBlast New Rules About Dimpled Chads,in 36 DAYS, supra note
56, at 107 (detailing the change in recounting standards and the Republican dissent).
83. See Filkins & Canedy, supra note 82, at 134-35 (relating the public pressure that
influenced some of the Canvassing Board members to stop the counting).
84. Todd S. Purdum, Bush Wins Again But Gore Won't Concede, in 36 DAYS, supranote
56, at 165; see GILLMAN, supra note 59, at 77 (discussing how Secretary Harris refused to accept
Palm Beach County's incomplete and untimely submitted hand recount, which at the time of the
deadline had netted Vice President Gore an additional 192 votes); see also Don Van Natta Jr. &
Rick Bragg, How HarrisRejected Palm Beach Recount, in 36 DAYS, supra note 56, at 171
(recounting how the Secretary refused Palm Beach County's recount even after an appeal for an
extension with only 800 to 1000 votes left to count).
85. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam).
86. See id. at 76 ("As a general rule, this Court defers to a state court's interpretation of a
state statute.").
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stressed, however, that in the present case the Florida Supreme Court had
undertaken an interpretation of a Florida election statute that the Florida
legislature had enacted under the authority given it "by virtue of a direct grant
87
of authority made under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution."
Furthermore, the Court noted that the Florida election statute implicated the
"safe harbor" provisions of the federal Electoral Count Act of 1887, which
guarantees the integrity and acceptance of any state's Electoral College slate
that is determined, pursuant to pre-existing laws and procedures, at least six
days prior to the meeting of the Electoral College.88 The Court implied that
these federal interests justified its review of the matter. More importantly, the
Court suggested that these federal constitutional and statutory links must bear
on the interpretation the Florida courts (in this case, the Florida Supreme Court)
give the Florida election statute on matters associated with presidential
elections.8 9 The Court, however, felt itself unable to review the Florida
Supreme Court's opinion in light of these federal interests because the basis of
its decision regarding these questions lacked the requisite certainty and
precision. 9° The Court vacated the Florida Supreme Court's decision and
remanded the matter back to that court giving it specific instructions to:
(1) clarify the degree to which the Florida Constitution circumscribes the
authority the U.S. Constitution extended to the Florida legislature; and (2) to
clarify the significance of the federal "safe harbor" provision to the Florida
election scheme. 9' As if conscious of the compounding political tension, the
87. Id.
88. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). The statute provides:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the
appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or contest
concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State, byjudicial or
other methods or procedures, and such determination shall have been made at least
six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such determination
made pursuant to such law so existing on said day, and made at least six days prior
to said time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the
counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter
regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointed by such State is
concerned.

Id.
89. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. at 76-77 ("There are expressions
in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida that may be read to indicate that it construed the
Florida Election Code without regard to the extent to which the Florida Constitution could,
consistent with Art. 11, § 1, cl.2, 'circumscribe the Legislative power.'").
90. See id. at 78 (citing Minnesota v. Nat'l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 555 (1940))
("[C]onsiderable uncertainty" is a "sufficient reason for [the Court] to decline ... to review the
federal questions asserted to be present.").
91. See id. (stating that the Court is "unclear as to the extent to which the Florida Supreme
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U.S. Supreme Court's decision was remarkable for its restraint and unanimity.
Still, its decision to take the case at all was alarming to most observers 92 and
hinted at the grave temptation towards the judicialization of this purely political
dispute facing the Court.
While the U.S. Supreme Court was fashioning its unanimous, seemingly
hands-off decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard,93 another
(and what would prove the final) round of legal proceedings was already
underway. The day after Secretary Harris's certification of the Florida vote on
November 26, 2000, Vice President Gore sued in a Florida trial court in Leon
County to contest the newly (re)certified election results.94 Vice President Gore
asserted in his complaint that, in certifying the election returns, Secretary Harris
included illegal votes and wrongly rejected a number of legal votes, both in
sufficient numbers to change or place in doubt the result of the election.9 5 The
trial court, after a frenetic hearing in the case, issued its decision denying the
Vice President's claims for relief on the same day the U.S. Supreme Court
issued its opinion in Bush v. Palm Beach County CanvassingBoard.96 The
Court saw the Florida Constitution as circumscribing the legislature's authority... [and] as to
the consideration the Florida Supreme Court accorded to 3 U.S.C. § 5").
92. See GILLMAN, supra note 59, at 74 ("And so it was a surprise to most observers when
on Friday, November 24, just one day after Thanksgiving and two days before the recount
deadline, the justices of the Supreme Court announced that they were stepping into the fray.");
David A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, in THE VOTE, supra note 3, at
184, 193 ("The Court's decision to grant certiorari was very surprising to most observers, and it
was a highly significant event."); Cass R. Sunstein, Order Without Law, in THE VOTE, supra
note 3, at 205, 209 ("At the time, most observers thought it exceedingly unlikely that the Court
would agree to hear the case."). But see GILLMAN, supra note 59, at 72 ("Some former law
clerks to conservative justices indicated that they would not be surprised if the Court took the
case. U.C. Berkeley law professor John C. Yoo, a former law clerk for Justice Clarence
Thomas, said that it would be best for the country if the Supreme Court got involved, since 'the
political process is starting to break down."').
93. The Court's decision was only seemingly hands-off, when one considers that "all
actors subsequently behaved as if the Court had actually decided that Article 11 of the
Constitution or the Electoral Count Act would be violated were the state courts to rely on the
state constitution or make 'new law."' Pildes, supra note 3, at 163. In this sense, the only
possibility for minimizing the Supreme Court's impact in such a highly strung context, would
have been total disengagement.
94. Florida election law provided for two phases of review, theprotestphase (carried out
in the period prior to the certification of the returns) and the contest phase (carried out in the
period after the certification of the returns). See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166 (2000) (current
version at FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166 (2002)) (describing the protest phase in detailing the
procedures for recounts); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (2000) (current version at FLA. STAT.
§ 102.168 (2002)) (detailing the contest phase of the election).
95. FLA. STAT. § 102.168(3)(c) (2000) (current version at FLA. STAT. § 102.168(3)(c)
(2002)).
96. Gore v. Harris, No. CV-00-2808 (Leon County Cir. Ct. filed Dec. 4,2000) overruled
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trial court, relying on a remarkably strict (and to some, an obviously flawed)
standard of proof,97 found that Vice President Gore had failed to present
"credible statistical evidence [or any other] competent substantial evidence to
establish by a preponderance a reasonable probability that the results of the
statewide election in the State of Florida would be different from the result
which has been certified by the State Elections Canvassing Commission.""
The Vice President had filed his appeal even before the trial court had read its
ruling to conclusion.99 Meanwhile, legal maneuvers from Governor Bush's
campaign on other fronts shadowed the challenge the Vice President's
campaign pursued.' 00
On December 8, 2000, four days after the trial court's ruling on Vice
President Gore's contest of the election, the Florida Supreme Court reversed
the trial court, although without managing the unanimity that had characterized
the decisions of both the Florida and U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the first
round of litigation. Entering the fourth week of a wearying and uncharted
election process, with the time required for a recount effort on a grand scale
quickly running up against the December 12 "safe harbor" deadline and the
December 18 vote of the Electoral College, the political tension finally seemed
by Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000), in BUSH v. GORE:
COMMENTARY 53 (E.J. Dionne Jr. & William Kristol eds., 2001).

THE COURT CASES AND THE

97. See GILLMAN supra note 59, at 102 ("If there was one saving grace for the Gore team
it was that [Judge] Sauls seemed to base his decision on a fundamental legal mistake-and to
many commentators, an obvious legal mistake."). The trial court had based its decision, in part,
on a decision of the Florida Supreme Court handed down under a now superseded version of
Florida's election law.
98. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1255 (Fla. 2000) (discussing trial court's
handling of the case).
99. GILLMAN, supra note 59, at 102.
100. It is only possible with the benefit of hindsight to relegate these proceedings to a
reference in a footnote. Any one of the election cases being heard in a number of federal and
state courts could have been the deciding volley and all, but for the limits imposed by space and
time, merit analysis. See generally Siegel v. Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163 (11 th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(rejecting the Republican candidate's request for preliminary injunctive relief because plaintiffs
had not shown irreparable injury); Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133 (11 th Cir. 2000)
(en banc) (rejecting the Bush campaign's 14th Amendment challenges to the practice of
conducting manual recounts in Florida). There were also the formal legal challenges from the
Gore campaign to nearly 25,000 absentee ballots from Seminole and Martin Counties, to which
a sizeable number (4,000) of improper or irregular ballots had been added. The trial courts
rejected the claims. See Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., No. 00-2816, 2000 WL
1793429, at *4 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 2000) (finding that the information listed as necessary for a
request for an absentee ballot is directory, not mandatory and allowing the absentee ballots to be
counted); Taylor v. Martin County Canvassing Bd., No. CV 00-2850, 2000 WL 1793409, at *5
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 2000) (concluding that the irregularities in the absentee ballots did not
affect the sanctity of the ballot or the integrity of the election).
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to crack the objective facade of the judiciary. The four-judge "Democratic"' 0'
majority issued a per curiam opinion in which it ruled that Vice President Gore
was entitled to a manual recount of the undervotes in the counties that he had
targeted.' °2 But, the majority further reasoned, the ultimate relief required a
counting of the legal votes contained in the undervotes in all counties where the
undervote had not yet been subjected to manual tabulation.'0 3 The majority
interpreted Florida's election legislation and case law as placing a controlling
emphasis on discerning and giving force to the "will" and "intent" of the
voters,' 4 thereby justifying a low standard for ordering the recount and a broad
standard for defining a "legal vote." The majority, however, could not justify
limiting the manual count of undervotes to the counties Vice President Gore
targeted. At least implying a concern for equality and fairness issues, the court
agreed with Governor Bush's argument that "because this is a statewide
election, statewide remedies would be called for."' 5 The majority ordered the
matter back to the trial court and charged it with fashioning, under the broadest
possible discretion
and jurisdictional reach, "any relief appropriate under the
06
circumstances."1
Chief Justice Wells most fiercely represented the dissenters on the Florida
Supreme Court, declaring: "I could not more strongly disagree with [the
majority's] decision to reverse and prolong this judicial process."'0 7 Chief
Justice Well's dissent contained a disparate litany of concerns and complaints:
that the majority based its opinion on newly minted precedent not applicable to
this election, that the majority's opinion would withstand the constitutional
scrutiny of the U.S. Supreme Court, and that the state lacked the time to pursue
the sweeping recount ordered by the majority. 08 Chief Justice Wells also
101. The majority consisted of justices appointed by Florida's previous Democratic
governors while the three-judge minority consisted of justices appointed by Florida's
Republican Governor Jeb Bush.
102. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam), rev'dsub nom. Bush
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 1253 ("This essential principle, that the outcome of elections be determined
by the will of the voters, forms the foundation of the election code enacted by the Florida
Legislature and has been consistently applied by this Court in resolving elections disputes.");
see also id. at 1256 ("This Court has repeatedly held, in accordance with the statutory law of
this State, that so long as the voter's intent may be discerned from the ballot, the vote constitutes
a 'legal vote' that should be counted.").
105. Id. at 1261.
106. Id. at 1262 (improperly citing FLA. STAT. § 102.168(5) when § 102.168(8) was the
proper legislative provision).
107. Id. at 1263 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1262-70 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
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expressed regret for the majority's failure to exercise judicial restraint, which
he regarded as a controlling principle in political disputes of the kind which the
court faced in this case. "At common law," the Chief Justice urged, "[T]here
was no right to contest in court any public election, because such a contest is
political in nature and therefore outside the judicial power."'10 9 Recognizing
that the legislature had nonetheless provided for judicial intervention in election
matters, Chief Justice Wells nonetheless passionately insisted that: "Judicial
restraint in respect to elections is absolutely necessary because the health of our
democracy depends on elections being decided by voters-not judges.""o It
was a warning, though perhaps itself politicized, that shed light on the rarefied
sphere of pure politics.
Over the dissenters' objections, the court returned the case to the trial
court and a statewide manual recount of Florida's now month-old presidential
election results began."' It was to be a short-lived effort. In the early
afternoon of December 9, 2000, the day following the Florida Supreme Court's
ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Governor Bush's application for a stay
of the recount and agreed to review the Florida Supreme Court's decision."12
2. The Relevant Law
Through the Florida Supreme Court's second decision in the matter (Gore
v. Harris), the controlling law had predominantly consisted of Florida's
constitution and statutes, reflecting the local nature of the conflict, in spite of its
national implications. This consequence resulted from the United States
Constitution's clear delegation of the matter (election of the Electoral College)
to the legislatures of the states. Article II of the Constitution provides that:
"Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,
a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress."' "
Nonetheless, in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, the
Supreme Court's first decision in the matter, the Supreme Court signaled that
the Article H delegation did not remove all federal constitutional (and
presumably statutory) meaning from the presidential election process conducted
109. Id. (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 1264 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
111. See GiLLMAN, supra note 59, at 119 (discussing how Judge Lewis set the deadlines for
the recount and limited objections to in-writing only).
112. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 98 (2000) (per curiam).
113. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1,cl. 2.
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by the states.1 4 True to this warning, both Article II and especially the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"' were featured in the
Supreme Court's decision in Governor Bush's appeal of the Florida Supreme
Court's decision in Gore v. Harris. Federal statutes, especially the Electoral
Count Act of 1887, also played a role, particularly because they established
the timeline for the election and Electoral College process. Federal law, for
example, sets the date for the election (of the Electors) as well as the date for
the casting of the Electoral College votes. 16 More important to the case as it
arose to the U.S. Supreme Court after the Florida Supreme Court's Gore v.
Harrisdecision was the "safe harbor" deadline of the Electoral Count Act of
1887, which provides for the uncontested receipt of a state's Electoral
College slate." 7
Although these federal constitutional and statutory norms ultimately
controlled the resolution of the legal battle between Vice President Gore and
Governor Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court, in its consideration of the appeal
from the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Gore v. Harris,was principally
concerned with the application of federal norms to the Florida Supreme
Court's interpretation of the state's election laws. For this reason, a summary
of the law relevant to the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore also
requires consideration of the Florida constitutional and statutory law
implicated by the election dispute. In its interpretation of Florida election
law, the Florida Supreme Court gave signal importance to Article I, Section 1
of the Florida Constitution, which states that "[a]ll political power is inherent
in the people."' 8 The Florida Supreme Court also found that Article IV,

114. Palm Beach County CanvassingBd., 531 U.S. at 76-77. The Court wrote:
[1]n the case of a law enacted by a state legislature applicable not only to elections
of state offices, but also to the selection of Presidential electors, the legislature is
not acting solely under the authority given it by the people of the State, but by
virtue of a direct grant of authority made under Art. II,§ I, cf. 2 of the U.S.
Constitution.
Id.
115. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.").
116. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl.
3 ("The Congress may determine the Time of choosing
the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same
throughout the United States.").
117. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110(2000) (per curiam) (stating that the December12
deadline had come and no constitutionally sufficient recount procedure had begun); 3 U.S.C.
§ 5 (2002) (outlining "Safe Harbor" deadline).

118.

FLA. CONST. artl,§ 1.
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Section 1 of the Florida Constitution should control its interpretation of the
state's election laws, stating that:
All elections by the people shall be by direct and secret vote. General
elections shall be determined by a plurality of votes cast. Registration
and elections shall, and political party functions may, be regulated by
law; however, the requirements for a candidate with no party affiliation
or for a candidate of a minor party for placement of the candidate's name
on the ballot, shall be no greater than the requirements for119a candidate of
the party having the largest number of registered voters.
Of the numerous, interlocking rules set forth in the Florida Election
Code for the regulation of elections,120 only Florida's statutory provision for
"contesting" the certified election results related to the Supreme Court's
decision in Bush v. Gore.12 ' An aggrieved candidate or elector could
challenge a county's certification of the election results in court, alleging
among other grounds, the "[r]eceipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection
of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of
the election."1 22 The trial court in which the party filed the contest receives
sweeping powers to "fashion such orders as [it] deems necessary to ensure
that each allegation in the complaint is investigated, examined, or checked, to
prevent or correct any alleged wrong, and to provide any relief appropriate
'
under such circumstances." 12
The issue for the Supreme Court was, in
particular, the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the statutory terms:
(1) "legal votes," which, based on a survey of other Florida election statutes
as well as Florida and extra-jurisdictional case law, the Florida Supreme
Court defined as any "clear indication of the intent of the voter"; 2 4 and
(2) "rejection [of a number of legal votes]," which, again based on a survey
of Florida and extra-jurisdictional case law, the Florida Supreme Court
defined as "a voting machine fail[ing] to count a ballot, which has been
executed in substantial compliance with applicable voting requirements
and
21
choice."'
definite
a
express
to
voter
the
of
intent
clear
reflects, the

119.

FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 1.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 97-106 (West 2002).

120.
121.

See Gore, 531 U.S. at 101 (explaining Gore's use of the contesting statute).

122.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(3)(c) (West 2002).

123. FLA. STAT. § 102.168(8) (2000).
124. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1257 (Fla. 2000), rev'dsub nom.Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiamn).
125. Id.
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3. The Supreme Court's Decision in Bush v. Gore
The decision the U.S. Supreme Court issued on December 12, 2000 is
better understood as a set of decisions, with a controlling per curiam opinion, a
concurring opinion from Chief Justice Rehnquist (joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas), and separate dissenting opinions, in various constellations of
agreement, from Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg and Justice
Breyer. Because they explicitly invoke the tensions between judicialization and
popularism that are central to the Article's analysis, the following section will
discuss the dissenting opinions, which consider the implications for
judicialization of the Bush v. Gore decision.
a. Per Curiam Opinion and Equal Protection
Governor Bush appealed the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Gorev.
Harris on two grounds: (1) The Florida Supreme Court's decision violated
Article II of the United States Constitution because it constituted the post hoc
judicial imposition of standards for resolving an election dispute in a matter
clearly designated to the state legislature's authority; and (2) The manual
recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court was so significantly void of
standards as to risk a violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses. 26 Only the latter of these claims found favor with a majority of the
Court, and it is the Equal Protection and Due Process implications of the
Florida Supreme Court's decision that the Court's majority considered in its per
curiam opinion.127
The per curiam majority's decision depends, primarily, on the
constitutionally protected status of the right to vote for presidential electors.
Recognizing that the Constitution does not secure the right to vote for
presidential electors as such,1 8 the majority noted that all the state legislatures,
to which the Constitution delegated the plenary power to select the presidential
electors, have opted for statewide popular elections as the method for selecting
presidential electors. 29 Vesting the citizens with the right to vote for the
President of the United States in this way creates, the per curiam majority
explained, a fundamental and protected right. 3 The per curiam majority then
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See Gore, 531 U.S. at 103 (stating the questions presented).
See id. (finding a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
See id. at 104 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1).
Id.
Id.
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emphasized that one part of such a fundamental right is that the Constitution
requires its equal exercise. 13' Having granted the right to vote, the per curiam
majority explained, the "State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate
treatment, value one person's vote over that of another.' ' 2 This principle, the
majority reasoned, has its expression in the Court's "one-person, one-vote"
jurisprudence, especially to the degree that this principle prohibits disparate
34
33
treatment of voters from one county to the next.1 As will be discussed later,1
it is precisely this line of decisions through which the Court embarked upon its
radical judicialization of the law of democracy, a path that would lead the
Court's per curiam majority to this moment: the judicialization of pure politics.
The per curiam majority concluded that the Florida Supreme Court's
decision violated the "one-person, one-vote" precedent by ordering a statewide
manual recount of undervotes, guided by nothing more than the dictate to give
force to the "intent of the voter" and without identifying "the actual process by
which the votes were to be counted.' 13" The per curiam majority held that the
Florida Supreme Court had "ratified uneven treatment" by permitting "unequal
evaluation of ballots in various respects" in the counties' conduct of the manual
recount.' 3 6 The per curiam majority finally held that the Florida Supreme
Court, though possessing the power to "assure uniformity has [instead] ordered
a statewide recount with minimal procedural safeguards."' 37 For this reason,
and in light of the inequalities that would result, the Court found the Florida
Supreme Court's decision in Gore v. Harris to be a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause and reversed. 3 '
As the per curiam majority noted, seven justices concurred in the
conclusion that the recount the Florida Supreme Court ordered in Gore v.
39
Harris presented some constitutional (Equal Protection Clause) concern.
131. See id. (finding that "more than the initial allocation of the franchise" receives equal
protection).
132. Id. at 104-05 (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
133. Id. at 107 (citing Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963)).
134. See infra notes 203-06 and accompanying text (discussing Equal Protection's role in
the extension ofjudicialization).
135. Id. at 109. The Supreme Court's majority was at pains to affirm this standard as an
"abstract proposition and starting principle." Id. at 106. The majority wondered who, with what
qualifications and pursuant to what system of review, would count the ballots. Id. at 109.
136. Id. at 106-07 (2000). The majority worried not only about deviance between counties
but also within counties. Id. at 106.
137. Id. at 109.
138. See generally id. at 100-11.
139. Id. at I II (Souter, . & Breyer, J., dissenting).
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The more contentious issue, upon which the Court divided 5-4, was the nature
of the remedy. 40 The per curiam majority seized upon the Florida Supreme
Court's dicta in the first of the 2000 presidential election cases to conclude that
Florida's election laws aimed to take advantage of the federal Electoral Count
Act's "safe harbor" provision.' 4' In pursuit of that aim, in consideration of the
"substantial additional work" needed to bring the recount into compliance with
the Equal Protection Clause, and confronted with the fact that the "safe harbor"
deadline (December 12) would lapse in a few hours, the per curiam majority
was satisfied to simply reverse the Florida Supreme Court's order for a
statewide recount and thereby remove any obstacles in the way of the Florida
vote tabulation the Florida Secretary of State certified on November 26, 2000:
Governor Bush won the Florida election and Florida's twenty-five Electoral
College slate by a total of 537 popular votes.
b. ChiefJustice Rehnquist's Concurrence andArticle II
Concurring in the per curiam majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist
(joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas) wrote separately to articulate the Article
II concerns the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Gore v. Harris
presented. 42 Recognizing his frequent deference to state courts (like the
Florida Supreme Court in the case at hand), Chief Justice Rehnquist sought to
distinguish his participation in the majority's reversal of the Florida Supreme
Court by explaining that in most cases the interaction of the various branches of
a state's government neither implicates nor finds clear direction in the federal
Constitution. 43 In those cases, the Chief Justice implied, the Supreme Court is
wise to be guided by the principles of comity and federalism in deferring to
140. Id. Justices Souter and Breyer, though concurring in the majority's constitutional
interpretation, would have reversed and remanded the case back to the Florida Supreme Court
with orders to fashion a standard for the conduct of the statewide manual recount that would
comply with the demands of the Equal Protection Clause and perhaps permit its resolution prior
to the date set for casting the Electoral College votes (December 18, 2000). Id. at 134-35
(Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 146 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
141. See id. at 110 ("The Supreme Court of Florida has said that the legislature intended
the State's electors to participat[e] fully in the federal electoral process," as provided in 3 U.S.C.
§ 5 (quoting Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1289 (Fla. 2000),
vacated sub nom. by Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per

curiam))).
142. See id. at 111 (Rehnquist, CI., concurring) (asserting that "there are additional
grounds" for reversing the Florida Supreme Court).
143. See id. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (stating that the republican form of
government typically prevents state courts from addressing federal Constitutional questions).
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state courts.'" For the Chief Justice, the present case posed a much different
set of circumstances because the Constitution, in Article II, clearly assigns
priority to the state legislatures in the matter of presidential elections.' 41 Thus,
the choice confronting the Court was between Florida's Supreme Court and
Florida's legislature. On this point, the Chief Justice concluded, Article II of
the Constitution made the matter clear:
What we would do in the present case is precisely parallel: Hold that the
Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the Florida election laws
impermissibly distorted them beyond what a fair reading required, in
violation of Article 11. This inquiry does not imply disrespect for state
courts but rather
respect for the constitutionally prescribed role of state
legislatures.146
The remainder of Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence consists of a
catalogue of the Florida Supreme Court's unreasonable departures from
Florida's controlling "legislative scheme,"'147 "legislative wish,"' 148 clearly
expressed legislative intent and "statutory framework"'149 with respect to
Presidential elections and the review of elections. Among the departures the
Chief Justice noted were the Florida Supreme Court's extension of the statutory
period for bringing an election protest by seven days, with its concomitant
effect on the length of time allowed for an election contest. 50 The Chief
Justice noted the Florida Supreme Court's disregard for the statutory
significance of the Secretary of State's certification of the tabulation of the
vote, which should have elevated the standard of review applied by the courts
in an election contest proceeding.'' The Chief Justice also characterized as
unreasonable the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the statutory terms
"legal vote;" he concluded that: "Florida statutory law cannot reasonably be
144. Id. (Rehnquist, CI., concurring).
145. See id. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (explaining that Article 11"'conveys the
broadest power of determination' and 'leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the
method of appointment."' (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892))).
146. Id. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
147. Id.at 118, 120 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
148. Id. at 120 (Rehnquist, CI., concurring).
149. Id. at 122 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
150. See id. at 117-18 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1220 (Fla. 2000), vacated sub nom. by Bush v.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam) (asserting that
lengthening the time to protest an election "necessarily shortened the contest period for
Presidential elections").
151. See id. at 118 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("The certified winnerwould enjoy
presumptive validity, making a contest proceeding by the losing candidate an uphill battle.").
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thought to requirethe counting of improperly marked ballots."5' 2 Finally, the
Chief Justice remarked that the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Gore v.
Harris"jeopardizes the 'legislative wish' to take advantage of the safe harbor
provided by 3 U.S.C. § 5.""' In all of this criticism of the Florida Supreme
Court's judicial incursion into this highly sensitive political context, Chief
Justice Rehnquist failed to acknowledge the judicializing tendency of the per
curiam majority opinion with which he was writing to concur.
c. The Dissenters: Voices for JudicialRestraint
The four justices dissenting from the majority's per curiam judgment and
Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion took a variety of (mostly counter)
positions on the substance of the claims Governor Bush asserted. 5 4 For this
reason, they aligned themselves in various constellations with each other and,
in two cases, in part with the majority.15 1 Common to each of the dissenting
opinions, however, is a clear call for judicial restraint counseling the Court to
refrain from deciding the dispute, or, if it felt itself compelled to engage the
case, to issue only the most minimal judgment, thereby permitting the
popularist mechanisms of the Constitution and the Electoral Count Act of 1887
to take their course. The dissenters, thereby, at least implicitly recognized the
judicializing significance of the moment. It was not the first time, in the
twisting course of the proceedings, that Justices had voiced concerns about
judicial intervention. In the first of the U.S. Supreme Court opinions, the Court
noted the reserve and deference with which it normally reviewed "a state
court's interpretation of a state statute.'0 5 6 In fact, the Court's judgment in the
first of the two cases seems animated by this restraint.' 7 Prior to the U.S.
Supreme Court's December 9, 2000 stay of the statewide manual recount and
the Court's subsequent 5-4 decision bringing the election battle to an end, each
of the federal courts that had been called upon by the parties had maintained a
152. Id. at 118-19 (Rehnquist, C.J, concurring).
153. Id. at 120-21 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Palm Beach County Canvassing
Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1237 (Fla. 2000), vacated sub nom. by Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (per curiam)).
154. Justices Souter and Breyer dissented chiefly from the remedy imposed by the majority,
not the substantive conclusion regarding the Equal Protection Clause. See supra note 140 and
accompanying text (explaining the Justices' dissenting positions).
155. Supra note 140.
156. Palm Beach County CanvassingBd., 531 U.S. at 76.
157. See id. at 78 ("This is sufficient reason for us to decline at this time to review the
federal questions asserted to be present.").
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similar if eroding distance from the proceedings.5s As noted earlier,59 Florida
Supreme Court Chief Justice Wells strongly appealed for judicial restraint in
his dissent to the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Gore v. Harris. While
the federal courts had been concerned with federalism and comity in counseling
restraint, however, Chief Justice Wells had more pragmatic concerns. He
worried that prolonging the judicial process would "propel this country and this
state into an unprecedented and unnecessary constitutional crisis."'6'° In
addition to this concern, Chief Justice Wells urged that "finality must take
precedence over continued judicial process."' 61 No voice, up to the decision in
Bush v. Gore, had explicitly grappled with the popularist implications of
judicial intervention.
In urging judicial restraint, the dissenters to the Supreme Court's decisive
judgment from December 12, 2000 again invoked the principles of federalism
and comity. Justice Stevens, in his dissent, strongly appealed to these
principles and argued that the issues asserted failed to present substantial
federal questions meriting the Supreme Court's involvement in the case. 62 In
his now famous closing paragraph, Justice Stevens only hinted at the
judicializing implications of the per curiam majority's decision, concluding that
the per curiam majority's abandonment of the principles of federalism and
comity, in the interest of finality, must have depended upon an "unstated lack of
confidence in the impartiality and capacity of the state judges who would make
the critical decision if the vote count were to proceed." 63 This, Justice Stevens
complained, cast "the Nation's confidence in thejudge as an impartial guardian
of the rule of law,"' 64 as the real loser of the presidential election. Justice
Ginsburg substantially echoed Justice Steven's concerns for federalism in
arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court should have left the Florida judicial
proceedings undisturbed. "Unavoidably," Justice Ginsburg explained, "this
Court must sometimes examine state law in order to protect federal rights. But
158. For an assessment of the district and circuit court rulings, see generally Kevin Sack,
Federal Court Had Just Voted for Recount, in 36 DAYS, supra note 56, at 278; Kevin Sack,
Federal Court Rejects Bush Request to Bar Manual Recounts, in 36 DAYS, supra note 56, at
255; Kevin Sack, Federal Judge Defers to State Court, in 36 DAYS, supra note 56, at 62.
159. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text (discussing Florida Supreme Court
Chief Justice Wells' opinion in Gore v. Harris).
160. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1263 (Fla. 2000) (Well, C.J., dissenting) rev'd sub
nom. Bush v. Gore 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
161. Id. at 1270 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
162. See Gore, 531 U.S. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The federal questions that
ultimately emerged in this case are not substantial.").
163. Id. at 128-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 129 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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we have dealt with such cases ever mindful of the full measure of respect we
owe to interpretations of state law by a State's highest court.', 165 As an
indication of this restraint and deference, Justice Ginsburg noted the Court's
frequent certification to state high courts of state law questions underlying
federal claims in order to afford those "courts an opportunity to inform us on
matters of their own State's law because such restraint 'helps build a
cooperative judicial federalism,'" 66 and in recognition of the significance of
those courts' "common exposure to local law which comes from sitting in the
jurisdiction.' 67 Justice Ginsburg concluded: "Federal courts defer to state
high court's interpretations of the State's own
law. This principle reflects the
16
core of federalism, on which we all agree."' 1
The federalism argument for the Supreme Court's nonintervention or, in
the alternative, for restrained intervention, does not challenge the general role
of the judiciary in the proceedings but simply prefers the state courts to the
federal courts. In this sense, the arguments of Justice Stevens and Ginsburg
are not animated by concerns for judicialization in its collision with
popularism. In their dissenting opinions, however, Justices Souter and
Breyer insinuated the general impropriety of a judicial solution to this purely
political dispute.' 69 The per curiam majority also briefly acknowledged this
theme in the conclusion of its opinion. Recognizing the momentousness of
its decision to intervene, the per curiam majority nonetheless felt itself dutybound, albeit reluctantly, to act:
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are
the Members of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of the
Constitution's design to leave the selection of the President to the people,
through their legislatures, and to the political sphere. When contending
parties invoke the process of the courts, however, it becomes our
unsought responsibility to resolve the federal 17and
0 constitutional issues the
judicial system has been forced to confront.
Justices Souter and Breyer, on the other hand, followed these anxieties
to their appropriate conclusion: They would have preferred a political over a
judicial solution to the case. Justice Souter noted, in questioning the
significance of the federal questions presented for the Court's review, that "it
165. Id. at 137 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
166. Id. at 139 (Ginsburg,J.,
dissenting) (quoting Lehman Bro. v.Schein, 416 U.S. 386,
391 (1974)).
167. Id. at 138 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 142 (Ginsburg,J.,
dissenting).
169. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text (discussing the Justices' concerns).
170. Gore,531 U.S. at 11.
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is entirely possible that there would ultimately have been no issue requiring
our review, and political tension could have worked itself out in the Congress
following the procedure provided in 3 U.S.C. § 15."' 7 Justice Souter
repeatedly and approvingly invoked the possibility that the dispute could
have found its solution in the political branches. 72 What Justice Souter
implied, Justice Breyer quite nearly gives full voice, coming closer than any
other figure in the proceedings to raising the specter ofjudicialization against
which the political question doctrine provides protection.173 In questioning
the significance of the federal questions the case presented and counseling
the Court's restraint in deference to the Florida Supreme Court, Justice
Breyer also protested that the issues before the court draw their significance
from their political and not their legal nature. 74 "[T]his Court," Justice
Breyer argued, "should resist the temptation unnecessarily to resolve
tangential legal disputes, where doing so threatens to determine the outcome
of the election."' 75 This, far more than the mere political question doctrine, is
a concern for limiting the role of the judiciary in the realm of pure politics.
Justice Breyer insisted on the preferred role of the political branches in
resolving Electoral College disputes, citing the Constitution as well as the
76
Electoral Count Act of 1887 (and, extensively, its legislative history).
Justice Breyer concluded:
Given this detailed, comprehensive scheme for counting electoral votes,
there is no reason to believe that federal law either foresees or requires
resolution of such a political issue by this Court. Nor, for that matter, is
there any reason to think the Constitution's Framers would have reached
a different conclusion. Madison, at least, believed that allowing the
77
judiciary to choose the presidential electors "was out of the question."'
171. Id. at 129 (Souter, J., dissenting).
172. See generally id.at 130-33 (Souter, J., dissenting).
173. See id. at 153-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (analyzing the political, rather than judicial,
nature of the dispute). See generallyBaker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (refusing to apply the
political question doctrine when considering Tennessee's state legislature's malapportionment
problem); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) ("Questions, in their nature
political ... can never be made in this Court."); Fritz W. Scharpf, JudicialReview and the
Political Question: A FundamentalAnalysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966) (discussing the political
question doctrine).
174. See Gore, 531 U.S. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("But that importance is political,
not legal.").
175. Id. (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
176. See generally id. at 153-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XII;
3 U.S.C. §§ 5, 6 and 13).
177. Id. at 155 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing James Madison, 25 July 1787, reprintedin
5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 363 (2d ed. 1876)).
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4. Implicationsfor Judicializationof Bush v. Gore
The majority's opinion in Bush v. Gore constituted an implicit, though no
less resounding, victory for judicialization. This is true because, bearing in
mind the definition ofjudicialization this Article has adopted, 1 78 the Court's
decisive intervention unnecessarily preferred a judicial resolution to an
established, albeit elaborate and antiquated, popularist system for the resolution
of such Electoral College disputes.
a. The PopularistAlternative
In order to understand this claim it is necessary to consider, if only briefly,
the popularist scheme provided by the U.S. Constitution and federal law. The
Court refused to take resort in this popularist scheme in the Electoral College
dispute at the heart of Bush v. Gore. Instead, the Court preferred to intervene
and resolve the dispute itself.
The popularist scheme for resolving disputes over presidential elections
has both constitutional and statutory bases. Article 11, Section 1, Clause 3 of
the Constitution gives the House of Representatives (each state's delegation
possessing one vote) the power to elect the President in the event that no
candidate achieves an Electoral College majority or two candidates achieve a
majority but are tied:
The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if
such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed;
and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal
Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately
chose by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a
Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like
Manner chose the President. But in choosing the President, the Votes shall
179
be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote.
Again, in the Twelfth Amendment, the Constitution prefers the preeminently 80
popularist institution of the House of Representatives for the resolution of
uncertainties with respect to the outcome of Electoral College, providing that:
178.

See supra notes 9, 11 (defining judicialization); see also Part II (discussing the

judicialization of pure politics).
179. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § i, cl. 3.
180. As compared with any other institution of the federal government, the most popularist
body must be the House of Representatives:
As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common
interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of it under
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The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for
President and Vice President .... which lists they shall sign and certify, and
transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States.... and if
no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest
numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the
House of18Representatives
shall choose immediately, by ballot, the
1
President.
Federal law reinforces the Constitution's commitment of the law of
democracy to popularist institutions and procedures. Alongside the six-day
"safe harbor" provision described above, the Electoral Count Act of 1887 also
provides that a state legislature (regardless of the pre-existing rules/laws
governing the selection of electors) may direct the appointment of electors in
any manner deemed appropriate in the event that the state's electors have not
been identified by the day prescribed by law. 82 Furthermore, the Electoral
Count Act of 1887 establishes the process by which Congress should resolve
"different scenarios in which two slates of electors from the same state vie for
recognition as the true or correct slate."'183 In such a case, following a written
objection to the final Electoral College tally from at least one member of the
House and Senate, the challenge is presented to the two houses of Congress.' 84
As a guiding principle to Congressional involvement, Congress should give
priority to the Electoral College slate certified by the state's governor, unless
both houses of Congress agree that the votes certified by the govemor were not
"regularly given."'185 If, however, two Electoral College slates present
themselves to Congress, Congress should give preference to that slate
determined to be valid pursuant to the respective state's election review
procedures and submitted by the "safe harbor" deadline. 86 If both slates claim
to have met these requirements (rightful product of the state's election review
consideration [House of Representatives] should have an immediate dependence
on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are
unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be
effectually secured.
THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 361 (James Madison) (Benjamin F. Wright ed., 1966).
181. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
182. See 3 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) ("Whenever any State has held an election for the purpose of
choosing electors, and has failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by law, the electors
may be appointed on a subsequent day in such a manner as the legislature of such State may
direct.").
183. ABNER GREENE, UNDERSTANDING THE 2000 ELECTION 169(2001); see 3 U.S.C. § 15
(outlining the process of choosing between two groups of electors from the same state).
184. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
185. Id.

186.

Id.
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process and qualifying for the "safe harbor" protection), then the Electoral
Count Act charges the two Houses of Congress, acting separately, with
endorsing one or the other of the slates."8 7 If the House and the Senate disagree
at this point, the Electoral College slate bearing the governor's endorsement
claims priority. 18 Again, the Electoral Count Act charges both houses of
Congress with recognizing a slate of Electors in the event that the competing
slates presenting themselves neither have the benefit of a completed election
review process in the state nor the "safe harbor" status.'8 9 As before, if the two
houses of Congress cannot agree, the slate bearing the state governor's
endorsement prevails.'90
This process overwhelmingly favors popularist institutions, Congress and
state governors, as the determinative bodies in the event of an Electoral College
dispute. The only suggestion that the matter is one for the unaccountable and
unrepresentative judiciary is the cryptic reference to a state's election review
process, which may lead to an unintended decision-maker if it does not directly
anticipate the involvement of the state's judiciary. Significantly, however,
nothing about the phrase "election review process" necessarily implicates the
judiciary. Considering the legislative history of the 1887 Electoral Count Act,
the intention of Congress at that time was clearly to steer the process of settling
uncertainties with respect to the Electoral College back into popularist
institutions.
b. A SignificantShift Towards Judicialization
As strong as they were, the dissenting opinions of Justices Souter and
Breyer could have been much stronger with respect to the antipopularist
consequences of the majority's and Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions in Bush
v. Gore. In spite of their grave concerns in the present case, the reasonableness
of the dissenters' criticism of the judicialization inherent in the per curiam and
concurring opinions can be, at some level, attributed to the fact that, as Justices
of the Supreme Court, they have an inherent tolerance for, confidence in, and
approval of judicial (that is, unaccountable, unrepresentative) mechanisms.
Judges who could be radical opponents ofjudicialization would be rare. It can
also be attributed to the fact that the significant judicialization achieved by the
per curiam opinion is only implicit. The Court did not explicitly rule that the
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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judiciary, or the Supreme Court as the head of that branch of government, is
generally the necessary or even the preferred institution for the outcomespecific resolution of electoral disputes.' 9' The Court did not strike the
popularist procedures for resolving Electoral College disputes that the Electoral
Count Act of 1887 outlined as unconstitutional.192 To the contrary, the majority
explicitly tried to limit the impact of its decision to the case at hand, noting that
its "consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of
equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities."' 93
The implied nature and attempted delimitation of the judicialization the
Bush v. Gore decision achieved do nothing, however, to minimize the
decision's dramatic antipopularist impact. The Supreme Court had never
before intervened to decide the outcome of an election, let alone a Presidential
election. For this reason alone it is difficult to dispute the sheer epochal weight
and symbolic quality that the judicialization Bush v. Gore achieved. This is
true in part because of the supreme significance of the particular election at
issue. It merits repeating the painfully obvious: This was the presidential
election. It is also true because of the clarity of the judicializing impact of the
Court's decision: The decision was reached on questionable legal grounds by a
Court divided along partisan fronts while rejecting a constitutional and statutory
process involving a representative institution. In discrediting each of the
possible alternative justifications for the Court's intervention, whether invoked
by the Court itself or its defenders, Howard Gillman, in his book-length survey
of the election dispute, was unable to get beyond the fact that, all the while,
"there was a 211-year-old nonjudicial process in place for dealing with the
problem [in Congress].' 94 Gillman adamantly rejected the most common
claim among the Court's defenders that resort to this constitutionally and
statutorily prescribed course would itself have constituted a constitutional
crisis:
It could not be realistically asserted that ending public weariness or
prolonged uncertainty was enough to constitute the greater good of the
nation; that would have made the very process laid out in the Electoral
Count Act inherently inconsistent with the public welfare, which is
preposterous. Instead, the centerpiece of the imagined crisis was the

191. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (noting the general desire to defer electing the
president "to the people... and to the political sphere").
192. See id. at 110 (discussing Florida's adoption of the act's procedural safeguards for
federal elections).
193. Id. at 109.
194. GILLMAN, supra note 59, at 191.
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possibility that the procedure
1 95 laid down in 3 U.S.C. § 15 for resolving
disputes would have broken.
For Gillman, the Court's rejection of a Congressional solution was
characteristically antipopularist. "Ifthe constitutional crisis rationale is not a
simple post hoc rationalization of an otherwise inexcusable decision," he
argued, "then it mostly represents simple impatience with democratic
processes-a preference for quick, clear, imposed solutions over ones that are
forged through debate, compromise, or (as was most likely if election 2000
96
went to Congress) ugly, hardball politics." 1
The Bush v. Gore decision, in any event, does have significance as legal
precedent. Elizabeth Garrett suggested the case struck a revolutionary
jurisdictional posture that was in contrast to the Court's previous, not
infrequent-though, to her mind, frequently disastrous 97 -involvement in the
law of democracy, including voting rights issues, campaign finance regulation,
and the regulation of political parties.'9 " In spite of the Supreme Court's
substantial role in "shaping the electoral process,"' 99 Garrett distinguished the
Court's previous involvement in the field from the circumstances in Bush v.
Gore.200 Garrett explained that, unlike the general and nonpartisan nature of its
previous decisions, Bush v. Gore presented the Court with a situation in which
it actually knew that its decision would lead to the election of one of the parties
to the case.2 ' The Court undeniably stepped across a new frontier into the
realm of pure politics and, in so doing, cleared a way for a dramatically new
kind of judicial involvement
in elections. This new jurisdictional posture is
02
inherently antipopularist.
195. Id. at 194.
196. Id. at 195.
197. See Garrett, supra note 17, at 39, 44 ("Although the Court has a long history of
involvement inthe electoral process and inpolitical matters, it often makes the situation it finds
worse rather than better. In short, although the Court has entered the political thicket
frequently, its performance in these cases is disappointing.").
198. See id. at 40-48 (discussing prior instances ofjudicial involvement in elections and
arguing that the Gore Court should have exercised judicial restraint); see also ISSACHAROFF,
supra note 19, at 1-2 (discussing generally the impact that state institutions and legal structures
have on the democratic process).
199. Garrett, supra note 17, at 40.
200. See id.
at 40-45 (noting difficulties presented by the 2000 election that had never
before been considered by the Court).
201. See id. at 45 (discussing the likely effect of the Gore ruling and the Court's awareness
of it).
202. See id. at 39.
Some who have criticized the Court's reasoning inBush v. Gore or in its decision
to stay the recount have nonetheless concluded that its intrusion into the political
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The equal protection violation, which justified the Court's reversal of the
Florida Supreme Court, also builds, as another patina of precedent, upon an
emerging, radically judicialized legal doctrine. Pamela Karlan conceived of
Bush v. Gore as the most recent and most dramatic expression of the Court's
structural equal protection case law, according to which:
The Court deploys the equal protection clause not to protect the rights of an
individual or a discrete group of individuals, particularly a group unable to
protect itself through operation of the normal political processes, but rather
to regulate the institutional arrangements within which politics is
conducted. Neither Bush v. Vera and the other Shaw cases nor Bush v.
Gore fully answers the question of when, and why, courts should intervene
in the deeply messy process of partisan politics. And each adopts a
distressingly narrow perspective within which to measure equality.
Mark Tushnet also agreed that the case carries precedential weight, even if
from an alternative perspective. Tushnet suggested that even progressives
would come to view Bush v. Gore as correctly decided: "After all, the equal
protection doctrine the case articulated can certainly be turned to progressive
uses. We can, and should, take the case as another in a long line of decisions
by political actors-a category that includes judges-expanding and protecting
the expansion of the franchise." 2°4
Bush v. Gore is, in the end, a dramatic victory for judicialization.
Interposing itself in the election dispute as it did, at the expense of an
alternative popularist process, the Court preferred a clearly judicialized
process. 05 The popularist solution to the case was preferable, however, even if
Congress would have been no less partisan than the Court in deciding the case:
"The glaring difference, of course, is that senators and representatives caring to
retain their offices would have had to face the judgments of voters on their
manner of settling the election. 20 6 The Supreme Court will not. That, of
course, is the nature ofjudicialization.

process was justified because it settled the presidential election dispute before the
country was plunged into a constitutional or political crisis. This distrust of the
political branches to resolve controversies is part of a larger distrust of politics.

Id.
203. Pamela S. Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection: Regressive Doctrineon Changeable
Court, in THE VOTE, supra note 3, at 77, 78.
204. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 125.
205. See Samuel Issacharoff, PoliticalJudgments, in THE VOTE, supra note 3, at 55, 74
(noting that "every time a court strikes down an election statute... the unelected judiciary
substitutes its judgment" for those officials that are directly accountable to voters).
206. Michelman, supra note 5, at 133.
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B. The FederalConstitutionalCourt's Decision in the Hessen Election
Review Case
1. Background
On February 7, 1999, the Bundesland (Federal State) Hessen held
Landtag (State Parliament) elections. 20 7 The Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) won 43.4% of the vote (1,215,783 votes) and was awarded fifty of the
110 seats in the State Parliament. 20 8 The Social Democratic Party of Germany
(SPD) trailed in the poll with 39.4% of the vote (1,102,544 votes) and forty-six
seats.20 9 The Greens (Bundnis 90 or Die Grfinen) won 7.2% of the vote
(201,914 votes) and eight seats.210 The Free Democrats (FDP), the final party
to surpass the 5% standard for entering parliament, won 5.1% of the vote
(142,845 votes) and six seats. 2" The CDU established a governing coalition
with the Free Democrats and Roland Koch, the CDU candidate for
Ministerprdsident (State Executive), took office.21 2
The Hessen
Wahlprufingsgericht (Election Review Court) considered a range of initial
challenges to the validity of the election, focusing primarily on administrative
deficiencies like the untimely delivery of absentee voting materials, 2 3 but it
ultimately affirmed the validity of the election.21 4 Nearly a year later, the
207. See Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BverfGE] [Federal
Constitutional Court] 103, 111 (116) (reporting the outcome of the Hessen Election); 14 NEUE
JuRIsrIscHE WOCHtENSCmFT 1048 (2001) (unofficial publication of the decision by a
commercial journal); BVerfG, 2 BvF 1/00 vom 08.02.2001, Para.-Nr. (43), at
http://www.bverfg.de (Court's publication of the decision on its website); see also Hessen-Wahl
zum 15. Landtag am 07. Februar1999 [Election Return Website 1] (last visited Dec. 4, 2003)
at http://www.election.de/data/Itwhe99.html (German election returns website, reporting the
outcome of the Hessen election); Hessen [Ergebnisse][Election Return Website 2] (last visited
Dec. 4, 2003) at http://www.wahlrecht.de/ergebnisse/hessen.htm (German election returns
website, reporting the outcome of the Hessen election); Urteil des Wahlprufungsgerichtsbeim

Landtag zur Gultigkeit der Landtagswahl 1999, 30

STAATSANZEIGER FUR DAS LAND HESSEN

2350 [Official Public Record] (July 26, 1999) http://l 41.90.2.45/cache/Tabellen/stanz l999.htm
(last visited Dec. 4, 2003) (decision of the Hessen Election Review Court, published in the
official public record for the federal state Hessen, reporting the outcome of the Hessen election).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. With only a combined 48.5% of the vote, the governing CDU and FDP coalition
lacked an absolute electoral majority, but it had a one seat majority (fifty-six seats of 110) in the
parliament.
213. An explanation of the make-up and status of the Election Review Court follows, infra
Part lll.B.3.b.
214. See Official Public Record, supra note 207, at 2353 (rejecting initial, procedural
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Election Review Court, sua sponte, reopened the election review proceedings
after it was revealed that the CDU used unreported campaign funds in the
course of the state election campaign. 2 15 In a press release, the Presiding Judge
of the Election Review Court explained that his Court was concerned
particularly with the influence that the questionable funds might have had on
the outcome of the election.21 6 The reopening of the election review
proceedings gave rise to a petition to the Federal Constitutional Court from the
CDU-led government in Hessen that sought abstract judicial review of the
election review procedures Hessen's constitution and the attending statutes
provided.217
challenges to the election).
215. It is unlikely that the use of the funds (estimated in the millions of Euros), which were
drawn from a secret bank account in Liechtenstein, was actually illegal. See Georg Paul Hefty,
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG translated in Not for the State to Decide, at I (Feb. 26,
2001) (discussing the difficulty of invalidating an election based on a party's improper use of
finances). The Election Review Act provides, however, for the invalidation of an election for
lesser improprieties. For a German-language survey of the Hessen campaign funding scandal,
see Markus Deggerich, Die brennenden Fragen der CDU-Spendenaffare, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Dec.
19, 2000) at http://spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0, 1518,108558,00.html (reported in a popular
German weekly news magazine) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Die CDUSpendenaffare Chronologie des Niedergangs (Stand 28 Jan. 2001) (The CD U-Contributions
Scandal: Chronology ofthe Decline (Status as of Jan. 28, 2001)) (last visited June 8, 2002) at
http//www.landtag.hessen.de/gruene-fraktion.hessen/htm/06_material/0602_info/chronik.pdf
(report drafted by the opposition political party the Greens) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
216. See Die Landtagswahl von 1999 wird uberpruif, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Mar. 3, 2000) at
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,67626,00.html
(detailing the renewed
challenge to the Hessen election, based on the CDU contributions scandal) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Ralf Pasch & Gundula Zeitz, Eine brisante Aufgabe uber
viele Monate Hol1ein ist Berichterstatter beim Wahlprafungsgericht, FRANKFURTER RuNDscHAU
[daily German newspaper] (Mar. 11, 2000) at http//www.wahlrecht.de/news/2000/09.htm
(reporting renewed challenge to the Hessen election based on the CDU contributions scandal)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). As noted in the text accompanying note
208 supra, the CDU and FDP coalition did not command an absolute electoral majority (48.5%)
and led a potential SPD and Greens coalition by less than 2%. See supra notes 208-12 and
accompanying text (explaining the composition of the election's results). The difference
between the two coalitions was 54,170 votes and two seats in the parliament. Id.; see also
Election Return Website 1,supra note 207 (reporting the outcome of the Hessen election);
Election Return Website 2, supra note 207 (same).
217. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, which requires an actual case in controversy in order
to have jurisdiction over a matter, U.S. CONST. art III, § 2, cls. I & 2; Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83, 94 (1968) ("[Ihe judicial power of federal courts is constitutionally restricted to 'cases' and
'controversies."'), the German Federal Constitutional Court may, in the abstract, review a
federal or state law for its constitutional compatibility. GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Basic Law] art.
93.1(2); Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz [BverfGG] [Federal Constitutional Court Act] art.
13.6 (outlining the Court's jurisdiction and the controlling procedures before the Court). A
state government may initiate such review, as in the Hessen Election Review Case. "The
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2. Relevant Law

Article 78 of the Hessen Verfassung (HV-Hessen Constitution) provides the
procedures, standards and mechanisms for reviewing and invalidating a state
election." 8 The broad terms of the constitutional provision are more specifically
outlined in the attending Hessen Wahlprgfunggesetz (HWahlPriifG-Election
Review Act). 2 19 Article 78 of the Hessen Constitution establishes the following
procedures and standards: (1) an election review Court, established by the state
parliament, reviews the validity of an election; (2) an election is invalid in the event
that the Election Review Court finds that irregularities, criminal actions, or other
action that qualify as a violation of gute Sitten (good faith or common decency)
influenced the election; and (3) the Election Review Court is constituted of the two
highest-ranking judges of the state and three members of parliament.22 The State
Government, in its abstract judicial review application, placed the second and third
of these provisions before the Federal Constitutional Court.
The application to the Constitutional Court also sought abstractjudicial review
of Sections 1, 2, and 17 of the Election Review Act. Section 1 of the Election
Review Act establishes that the Election Review Court is constituted of,along with
three members of parliament, the President of the Hessen Verwaltungsgerichtshof
(Administrative Court) and the President of the Hessen Oberlandesgericht(Higher
Regional Court).22' Section 2 ofthe Election Review Act outlines the standards for
selecting the parliamentarians who will sit on the Election Review Court.222 Section
17 ofthe Election Review Act makes the written Urteile (judgments) of the Election
Review Court immediately enforceable.223
In its application to the Constitutional Court, Hessen's CDU-led Government
argued22 4 that the standard the Election Review Court was to apply in its review of
purpose of such review is not to vindicate the position of any party to the action, rather it is to
simply and objectively 'declare what the constitution means.'" DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUrIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 13 (2d ed. 1997).
218. Art. 78 HV.
219. Hessisches Wahlprifungsgesetz [HwahlPrUifG] [Hessen Election Review Act].
220. See Hessische Landesverfassung [HV] [Constitution of the Federal State Hessen] art.
78 (providing the structure and form of the Hessen Election Review Court).
22 1. See HwahlPrlftG § I (providing for the service of two judges on the Hessen Election
Review Court).
222. See HwahlPrfG § 2 (providing for the selection of state parliamentarians on the
Hessen Election Review Court).
223. See HwahlPrilfG § 17 (providing for the immediate enforceability of the decisions of
the Hessen Election Review Court). Section 17 of the Act is dependent upon § 15, which
establishes that the Election Review Court decides by way of an Urteil (judgment.).
224. BVerfGE 103, 111(116-119).
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the election for a violation of the gute Sitten, as well as the composition of and the
determinative role accorded to the Election Review Court, would constitute225a
violation of, inter alia: (1) Article 19.4 of the Grundgesetz (GG-Basic Law),
which establishes a right to judicial recourse and finds its applicability in the state
context by way of Article 28.1 of the Basic Law;226 (2) Article 20.2 of the Basic
Law,227 which requires the separation of public authority between legislative,
executive and judicial bodies; and (3) Articles 92 and 97 of the Basic Law, which
are the federal constitutional guarantees ofjudicial authority over legal disputes and
judicial independence.228 The Hessen Government's application focused especially
on the ambiguity and imprecision of the gute Sitten standard for invalidating an
election and the mixed nature of the Election Review Court, consisting as it does of
both judges and members of the state parliament, though nonetheless empowered to
act through judgments. 229 The government also objected to the inherent conflict of
interest the Hessen election review scheme created, which requires the
parliamentarians who are participating as members of the Election Review Court to
rule on the validity of the entire state parliamentary election, including the validity of
their status as elected parliamentarians.230
3. The ConstitutionalCourt's Decision in the Hessen Election Review Case
a. Defining gute Sitten
The Constitutional Court first addressed the state government's challenge
to the standard for the Election Review Court to apply when judging the
" '
validity of an election pursuant to Article 78.2 of the Hessen Constitution.23
225. See art. 19.4 GG ("Should any person's rights be violated by public authority, he may
have recourse to the courts.").
226. See art. 28.1 GG ("The constitutional order in the Lander must conform to the
principles of a republican, democratic, and social state governed by the rule of law, within the
meaning of this Basic Law.").
227. See art. 20.2 GG ("All authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercised by the
people through elections and other votes and through specific legislative, executive, and judicial
bodies.").
228. See art. 92 GG ("The judicial power shall be vested in the judges; it shall be exercised
by the Federal Constitutional Court, by the federal courts provided for in this Basic Law, and by
the courts of the Lander (Federal States)."); see also art. 97.1 GO ( "Judges shall be independent
and subject only to the law.").
229. BVerfGE 103, 111 (116-19).
230. Id.
231. The Court summarily disposed of the objections to the admissibility of the Hessen
state government's abstract judicial review application. Id.
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According to the state constitutional provision, an election is invalid if a
violation of the gute Sitten, among other improprieties, influenced it.232 This
was the standard the Election Review Court suggested that it would apply after
reopening its review of the 1999 election. 23" The Constitutional Court held that
the standard was constitutional, but in doing so, it crafted a narrow definition of
the concept that will make its application rare.234 This part of the Court's
232. See art. 78.2 HV (providing the standard of review to be applied by the Hessen
Election Review Court).
233. See supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing reopening of the review of the
1999 election).
234. The Court began its analysis of the constitutionality of the gute Sitten standard by
refusing to base its interpretation on the jurisprudence associated with the use ofthat standard in
the private-law context. BVerfGE 103, 111 (125-26). The Btlrgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB]
[German Civil Code], for example, provides for the invalidation of legal transactions that offend
the gute Sitten. See § 138.1 BGB ("A legal transaction which offends good morals is void.").
This application of the standard has its basis in the predominant legal and social morality, and it
has been broadly defined by the courts as the "standard of decency of all fair and just persons."
Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [German Supreme Civil
Court] 10, 228 (232); BGHZ 69, 295 (297); BGHZ 141, 357 (361) (author's translation).
Through the process of the mittelbare Drittwirkung der Grundrechte (direct, "radiating effect" of
the fundamental rights), the fundamental rights of the Basic Law also help shape the contours of
this provision of private law as they are reflective of the prevailing social values. See, e.g.,
BVerfGE 7, 198 (206) (holding that the influence of the scale of values of the basic rights
affects particularly those provisions of private law that contain mandatory rules of law and thus
form part of the ordre public). The Court stated:
It is equally true, however, that the Basic Law, which is not intended to be a system
that is neutral as to values, has also set up an objective value system in its section
on fundamental rights ....
This value system centered around the human
personality developing freely in the social community, and its dignity, must be
regarded as the basic constitutional decision for all spheres of law; legislation,
administration and the judiciary are given guidelines and inspiration by it.
Accordingly, it also manifestly influences the civil law: no provision of civil law
may be in contradiction with it; each one must be interpreted in its spirit.
Id. (citations omitted) (author's translation). Donald Kommers describes the Drittwirkung
principle as follows:
In the seminal Lath case (1958; no. 8.1), the Constitutional Court remarked that the
Basic Law's objective system of values "expresses and reinforces the validity of the
[enumerated] basic rights." Given the importance of this system, declared the
court, these objective values "must apply as a constitutional axiom throughout the
whole legal system," influencing private as well as public law. The court rules that
while basic rights apply directly to state action, they apply indirectly to substantive
private law.
KOMMERS, supra note 217, at 48-49. Pursuant to this loose definition of the gule Sitten
standard, the courts have invalidated private transactions in a broad range of circumstances,
including the failure to properly heed the ethical foundation of marital or family relationships,
the commercialization of personal or emotional decisions, the abuse of a position of trust (e.g.
patient or client relationship), and the exploitation of extreme economic advantage.
Instead, the Court drew exclusively upon the practice and application of election review
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decision does not, however, constitute the grander shift towards judicialization.
This consequence was more significantly a result of the Court's consideration
of the constitutionality of the Election Review Court itself.
b. The Election Review Court as a Mixed Entity
Addressing the state government's challenge to the mixed nature of the
Election Review Court, the Constitutional Court firmly asserted the
constitutional requirement that, pursuant to Article 92 of the Basic Law,
judicial power be entrusted to independent judges.2 35 The Constitutional Court
then defined "judicial power" as the power to enter a final, binding decision
regarding legal issues.236 The Court found the roots of the Election Review
Court's mixed nature in Germany's Weimar Constitution of 1919, which
sought to disperse broadly the merits of representative democracy throughout
the institutions of public authority, including the courts, rather than allowing
one branch of government to insulate itself from the will of the people.237

law. BVerfGE 103, 111 (127). The Court traced the standards applied to election review in the
Constitution of the German Reich of 1871 and the Weimar Constitution of 1919. Id. at 127-28.
The Court also considered the use of the standard in Hessen's 1946 Constitution as a clear
reaction against the National Socialist's manipulation of elections and the democratic
machinery. Id. at 126. Finally, the Court reviewed the contemporaryjurisprudence of state and
federal courts, as well as the academic literature, regarding the standards for invalidating
elections. Id. at 127-3 1. Based on this survey, the Court settled on an interpretation of thegute
Sitten standard for the election review context that focused on the state's obligation to remain
neutral and ensure equal opportunity in the electoral process. The Court explained that "an
impermissible influence on an election, resulting from an election error or mistake, exists only if
the influence on the formation of the voter's intent constituted a violation of the fundamental
freedom or equality of the election." Id. at 127 (author's translation). Institutional and
organized attempts at influencing the formation of the voter's electoral intent, especially by the
state, troubled the Constitutional Court. Id. at 133-34. The Constitutional Court concluded
that an action violates the gute Sitten if: (I) the state supports a specific party to a more than
acceptable degree and thereby affects the formation of the voter's electoral intent; (2) a private
third party, an involved political party, or an individual candidate uses force or pressure to affect
the formation of the voter's electoral intent; or (3) some other force, which is so strong that it
could only be avoided with the help of the courts or police, is brought to bear on the formation
of the voter's electoral intent. Id. at 132-33. Because the case before the Constitutional Court
proceeded in the abstract, the Court was not required to apply its interpretation oftheguteSitten
standard to the facts of the disputed Hessen state election, though the allegations of the use of
unreported campaign funds clearly appeared to fall short of the announced standard. Id. at 13233.
235. BVerfGE 103, 111 (136).
236. Id. at 137.
237. Id. at 138-39.
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Out of respect for the sound democratic reasoning and resoundingly
popularist constitutional pedigree upon which the Hessen Constitution relied in
creating the Election Review Court, the Constitutional Court did not directly
find the Election Review Court unconstitutional.2 3 The Constitutional Court
concluded, however, that the mixed judicial and political nature, teamed with
an attending lack of neutrality and judicial independence, rendered the Election
Review Court something less than a "court" in the constitutional sense.23 9
This characterization led the Court to another conclusion that left the
Election Review Court significantly weaker, if not incapacitated. The Court
credited the Hessen State Government's challenge to Section 17 of the Election
Review Act, which provided for the immediate enforcement of the Election
Review Court's decision. 240 This ruling effectively stripped the Election
Review Court of the central element of the Constitutional Court's definition of
judicial power: the final and binding effect of its decisions. The Constitutional
Court concluded that, pursuant to Article 92 of the Basic Law, "a decision with
such legal consequences in an election review process may not be reached by a
mixed institution like the 'Election Review Court."', 24' The Constitutional
Court found that the Election Review Court's authority to enter a
nonreviewable decision was unconstitutional, especially when the institution
intended to resolve disputed legal claims. 42 Such expressions of state
authority, the Constitutional Court2 43
emphasized, belong exclusively to the
province of the Article 92 judiciary.
In striking Section 17 of the Election Review Act the Constitutional Court
required that the Hessen State Court of Justice, with its constitutionally
guaranteed (as an Article 92 judicial institution) neutrality and independence,
have the opportunity to review the decisions of the Election Review Court. 2 "
To this end, the Constitutional Court recommended the reformulation of
Section 17 of the Election Review Act,245 making the decisions of the Election
238. Id.
239. The Court recalled that former Reichsminister for the Interior Hugo Preuss described
a similar entity under the Weimar Constitutionn as amittleres Verfahren (mixed process). Id. at
139.
240. See supra note 215 (discussing reopening of Hessen Election Case).
241. BVerfGE 103, 111 (139-140).
242. Id.
243. See id. at 140 (holding that public decisions having legal consequences must be taken
by the judiciary).
244. Id.
245. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 29
(1994) ("[T]he Constitutional Court commonly embellishes its decision with specific
instructions to the legislature as to how to assure future compliance with the Basic Law. This
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Review Court enforceable after one month and not immediately, as had been
the case.246
On February 23, 2001, just two weeks after the Constitutional Court
entered its decision in the abstract judicial review proceedings in the Hessen
Election Review Case, the Hessen Election Review Court entered its judgment
in the challenge to the validity of the CDU's 1999 state election victory.247
Applying the Constitutional Court's new, broad definition of the gutten Sitten
standard, the Election Review Court ruled that the CDU's use of illegal funds,
while regrettable, could not be said to have constituted the high degree of
coercion or force required to invalidate the election. 4 In its judgment, the
Election Review Court complained that the Constitutional Court's decision had
severely handicapped the Election Review Court's ability and authority to
review the challenge to the 1999 election.249
4. Implications of the Hessen Election Review Casefor Judicialization
The Constitutional Court's decision in the Hessen Election Review Case
constituted an explicit, and perhaps conclusive, victory for judicialization. It
involved the renunciation of the Hessen Election Review Court, one of the last
vestiges of the popularism that characterized the hopes of Germany's shortlived 1849 PaulskircheConstitution, which later ascended as the cardinal value
of the Weimar Constitution.
In both of these constitutional moments, and
even the 1871 Reichsverfassung,the popularist sanctity of the electoral process
251
marked the review of elections as a right of parliamentary self-management.
practice too will strike a familiar cord for readers conversant with such Supreme Court decisions
as Miranda v. Arizona and Roe v. Wade." (citations omitted)).
246. See BVerfGE 103, 111 (141-42) (reformulating § 17 of the Hessen Election Review
Act to make the Election Court's decisions enforceable only after thirty days).
247. See Beschluss des Wahlprfiungsgerichtsbeim HessischenLandtagzurNachprfifung
der Gidtigkeitder Landtagswahl 1999 [Hessen Election Review Court], 32 STAATSANZEIGER
FOR DAS LAND HESSEN 1162 (2001) (disposing of the challenges to the election), at
http://141.90.2.45/cache/Tabellen/stanz20O1.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2003) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Also published at 14 NEuE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHR1FT

1054 (2001) (unofficial publication of the decision by acommercial journal).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See BVerfGE 103, 111 (126) (remarking the fact that the Hessen Election Review
Court had its tradition in the Weimar Constitution). See generally H.W. KOCH, A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF GERMANY (1984); PETER C. CALDWELL, POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
AND THE CRISIS OF GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1997).

25 1. Martin Morlok, Wahiprafung; Mandatsprfifung (Artikel 41), [Election Review;
Review ofElectoral Mandates (Article 41)], in GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR, BAND II, 880, 881
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This tradition of popularist respect for pure politics, remarkably similar to the
emphasis the U.S. Constitution and federal law places on a Congressional
settlement of Electoral College disputes,252 was expressed in the Weimar
Constitution through a Wahlpriafungsgericht(Election Review Court). The
Wahlpruifungsgericht was a hybrid benefiting from the substantive and
procedural legal expertise of the judiciary (through the participation ofjudges)
while retaining, unmistakably, its popularist identity (through the majority
participation of parliamentarians).253 This institution is the very same the
Federal State Hessen adopted in its 1946 state constitution 254 and the Federal
Constitutional Court condemned to irrelevance in the Hessen Election Review
Case.
But, more than representing a choice for the unaccountable and
unrepresentative judiciary over more popularist institutions in the context of the
election disputes, popularist alternatives the existing law clearly favored, the
Constitutional Court's decision also had the effect of resolving the Hessen state
parliamentary election in favor of one candidate and his party, a circumstance
of which the judges of the Federal Constitutional Court must have been aware.
In this important respect, the Federal Constitutional Court's decision is similar
to the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore.
IV Converging on the Judicializationof Pure Politics
In spite of their similarities, the victories for judicialization scored by Bush
v. Gore and the Hessen Election Review Case are set against the backdrop of
divergent constitutional traditions. German judicialization is, largely, the
constitutionalized reaction to the distinct shock of the National Socialist
terror. 255 The present ascendancy ofjudicialization even in the sphere of pure
(Horst Dreier ed., 1998) (noting the majoritarian significance of the tradition of parliamentary
self-governance).
252. See infra Section IV.B (discussing the Supreme Court's intervention in the Florida
Electoral College dispute).
253. See Art. 31 Weimarer Reichsverfassung [WVR] (Constitution of the Weimar
Republic] (providing for an Election Review Court consisting of judges and a majority of
parlimentarians); Morlok, supra note 251, at 881 (noting the fact that the Election Review Court
created by the Constitution of the Weimar Republic provided that a majority of its members
would be parlimentarians).
254. See Art. 78.3 HV (providing for an Election Review Court consisting of three judges
and three parliamentarians). Notably, the Hessen Constitution is three years older than the
Federal Basic Law.
255. "The aim of the delegates [at the constitutional convention] was to reconstitute the
free democratic system envisioned by the Weimar Constitution while correcting the weaknesses
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politics, perhaps brought to its fullest fruition by the Hessen Election Review
Case, is explicitly a response to the popularist abuses that characterized the
Nazi regime.256 It is not possible, however, to refer to any similarly distinct
(and incontestably justifiable) stimulus in American constitutional history as a
trigger for the judicialization the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore
achieved.
A. German Judicializationof Election Review
1. German JudicializationGenerally
The judiciary enjoys distinct predominance in the German constitutional
order, notwithstanding the system's clear alignment with the parliamentary
tradition.25 7 The size of the German judiciary characterizes, at least
symbolically, the judiciary's predominance.2 58 In Germany there are as many
thought to have contributed to its demise." CURRIE, supra note 245, at 9 (citing Helmut
Steinberger, Bemerkungen zu einerSynthese des Einflusses auslandischerVerfassungsideen auf
die Entstehung des Grundgesetzes mit deutscher verfassungsrechtlichen Traditionen, in 40
JAHRE GRUNDGESETZ: ENTSTEHUNG, BEWAHRUNG UND INTERNATIONALE AUSSTRAHLUNG 41,53
(Klaus Stem ed., 1990) ("Weimar and the terrifying example of National Socialism stood clearly
in the foreground."); see also GORDON SMITH, DEMOCRACY INWESTERN GERMANY: PARTIES
AND POLITICS INTHE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 47 (1979) ("In devising the new constitution the almost
overriding pre-occupation of the delegates was to avoid the 'mistakes' of the Weimar Republic;
the Basic Law reflects a sustained attempt at rectification rather than a desire to construct a
visionary democratic order."); Kim Lane Scheppele, When the Law Doesn't Count: The 2000
Election andthe Failureofthe Rule of Law, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1361, 1367 (2001) (stating that
historical horrors, such as Nazi Germany, have led several countries to embody "rule-of-law"
clauses in their constitutions).
256. SMITH, supra note 255, at 44. Smith wrote:
The spectre of the Weimar Republic is not easily laid to rest in Germany. Even
though the Federal Republic has a reputation for stability, and slight faltering ofthe
political institutions immediately provokes an air of intense crisis: the ever-present
fear that a pronounced failure would show, after all, that liberal democracy does not
work in Germany. This insecurity may help to account for the marked reliance on
the constitution and on legal norms: they provide a measure of reassurance and
certainty in the face of the dangerous vagaries of politics [that is, popularist
institutions].
1d.
257. See Schulze-Fielitz, supra note 31, at 362 ("Aber die Justiz is doch zu einem
erheblichen Machtfaktor geworden, deren EinfluB sich tendenziell ausdehnt." ["But the
judiciary has become a considerable power with the tendency to expand its influence."]
(author's translation)); Sweet, supra note 30, at 191 (stating that the federal Constitutional
Court has "perhaps the most wide-ranging [jurisdiction] of any court anywhere").
258. Schulze-Fielitz, supra note 31, at 362-63.
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as 20,969 state and federal judges, or one judge for every 4,000 Germans.259
By comparison, in reputedly over-litigious America, there are 28,172 state and
federal judges, one judge for every 10,000 Americans. 2 ° These statistics
admittedly fail to account for the distinct functions the judiciary serve in the
two systems, including the fact that German judges, acting alone (that is, not
necessarily depending upon the case made by attorneys and often with only a
token role played by jurors), are responsible for resolving conflicts in a broad
range of social spheres. 26' The distinction between the role ofjudges in the two
systems, however, merely proves the point: The unaccountable and
unrepresentative judiciary plays a remarkably pervasive role in German
society. 262
The term Streitbare Demokratie (militant democracy), one of the
fundamental principles upon which the German Federal Republic stands,
dramatically captures the extreme limit to which the German constitutional
order is willing to substitute the wisdom of a professional, life-tenured judiciary
263
for that of the politically driven will exercised by popularist institutions.
StreitbareDemokratierefers to the concept that democracy is entitled to defend
itself against its internal enemies, 264 even by essentially undemocratic or
authoritarian means. 265 This fundamental limit on deliberative popularism finds
its expression in Articles 18 and 21.2 of the Basic Law, which provide for the
forfeiture of basic rights and the banning of political parties. 266 True to
Russell Miller, Judicial Selection Controversy at the Federal Court of Justice, 2
19 (2001), available at http://www.germanlawjoumal.com (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Schulze-Fielitz, supra note 3 1, at 363 (citing statistics from
1997 and numbering 20,999 German judges).
260. Miller, supra note 259, at 19.
261. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 86-88
(2001) (comparing the role of judges in American and German dispositions). For an
introduction to the various and numerous German subject matter jurisdictions, see NIGEL
259.

GERMAN L. J. 8,

FOSTER AND SATISH SULE, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWS

127-28 (3rd ed. 2002).

262. See Miller, supra note 259, 19 ("That explanation, however, should do nothing to
minimize the resounding fact that the judiciary plays an extraordinarily important role in the
function of German society.").
263. See KOMMERS, supra note 217, at 217-37 (providing a general explanation of militant
democracy in German Basic Law).
264. Internal enemies include those who (]) seek to abolish the free democratic order or to
endanger the existence of the Federal Republic; and (2) abuse the basic freedoms (speech, press,
teaching, assembly, association or property) "in order to combat the free democratic basic
order." Id. at 38.
265. See id. at 37-38 (stating that Article 18 authorizes the Federal Constitutional Court to
order the forfeiture of rights).
266. Article 18 provides: "Whoever abuses [a list of basic rights follows] in order to
combat the free democratic basic order shall forfeit these basic rights. This forfeiture and its
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judicialization, in both cases the Federal Constitutional Court, the system's
supreme judicial organ,267
is the sole and unappealable authority empowered to
penalties.
these
impose
The extensive role played by the Federal Constitutional Court in other,
more traditional questions, further betrays the depth of German judicialization.
As Donald Kommers remarked in defining the overtly political stature of the
Federal Constitutional Court:
The deeply ingrained Continental belief that judicial review is a political
act, following the assumption that "constitutional law-like international
law-is genuine political law, in contrast, for example, to civil and criminal
law," prompted Germans to vest the power to declare laws unconstitutional
in a special tribunal.., a separate constitutional tribunal with exclusive
jurisdiction over all constitutional.268disputes, including the authority to
review the constitutionality of laws.
In most cases, appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court is by right, not
even just for individual citizens asserting a violation of their basic rights, 269 but
also for the various political institutions and bodies endowed with standing
before the Court.270 With a clear path to the highest levels of the judiciary open
to political actors, and Germany's lack of a political question doctrine, 27 ' there
is open criticism that politics, the very matter of popularist activity, have been
subjugated to the judiciary. Such criticism notwithstanding, the sweeping and
non-controversial status of constitutional judicial review in postwar German
jurisprudence also exemplifies Germany's embrace ofjudicial involvement in
extent shall be declared by the Federal Constitutional Court." Article 21.2 provides: "Parties
that, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to undermine or abolish the
free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany
shall be unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule on the question of
unconstitutionality."
267. Id.
268. KOMMERS, supra note 217, at 3, 9 (quoting GERHARD LEIBHOLZ, POLITICS AND LAW
329 (1965)).
269. A constitutional amendment creating an individual's right to file a constitutional
complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court was ratified in 1969. See art. 93.l(4a) GG;
KOMMERS,supra note 217, at 14 ("[A]ny person may enter a complaint of unconstitutionality if

one of his or her fundamental substantive or procedural rights under the Constitution has been
violated by public authority.").
270. See art. 93 GG (containing a list of areas besides constitutional complaints within
which the Federal Constitutional Court rules, such as disputes between political institutions and
bodies).
271. CURIE, supra note 245, at 170 ("In accordance with this point of view, it is
commonly said that German law knows no equivalent of our political question doctrine: All
constitutional questions presented must be decided by the Constitutional Court.").
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popularist spheres. From the initial concern about the subject expressed during
the debates of the Parlamentarischer Rat (Parliamentary Council or
Constitutional Convention) in 1948,272 German law has come to accommodate
and the German public has come to accept (if not expect) a thorough-going
power of judicial review from the Federal Constitutional Court, including
abstract judicial review.2 73 Donald Kommers explained:
[T]he Constitutional Court is at the epicenter of Germany's constitutional
democracy. "The Basic Law is now virtually identical with its
interpretation by the Federal Constitutional Court," remarked Professor
Rudolf Smend on the court's tenth anniversary. Already by the 1990s
Smend's view was conventional
wisdom among German public lawyers and
274
constitutional scholars.

This encompassing role played by the judiciary is all the more surprising
when set in the context of a parliamentary system, which is meant to endow the
popularist institution with supremacy while the judiciary is reduced to the mere
interpretation of the law.275 In keeping with the parliamentary model, the Basic
Law anticipates the priority of the Bundestag (federal parliament), while at the
same time undermining it. At Article 20.3, for example, the constitution
establishes that: "The legislature shall be bound by the constitutional order, the
executive and the judiciary by law and justice. 27 6 David Currie explained that
277
Article 20.3 clearly invokes the traditional sense of parliamentary supremacy,
272. In the Parliamentary Council:
The controversy centered on the distinction between what some delegates regarded
as the "political" role of a constitutional court and the more "objective" lawinterpreting role of the regular judiciary. Some delegates preferred two separate
courts--one to review the constitutionality of laws (i.e., judicial review), the other
to decide essentially political disputes among branches and levels of government
(i.e., constitutional review).
KOMMERS,

supra note 217, at 8.

273. Art. 93.1 GG; §§ 76 & 77 BVerfGG. "One manifestation of this tendency is abstract
judicial review." KOMMERS, supranote 217, at 39; see also CURRIE, supranote 245, at 168-69
(discussing the pervasice role of abstract judicial review in the Constitutional Court).
274. KOMMERS, supra note 217, at 55.
275. CURRIE, supra note 245, at 134-49 (arguing that in the German system, the executive
is essentially (though admitting of characteristic exceptions to the rule) an extension of the
parliament); SMITH, supra note 255, at 62 (discussing parliamentary control over the judiciary);
see also arts. 62-69 GG (dealing with the Federal Government).
276. Art. 20.3 GG.
277. "Article 20.3 of the Basic Law states the fundamental principle of statutory supremacy
('Gesetzvorrang': While the legislature itself is bound only by the constitutional order ('die
berfassungsmdllige Ordnung'), the executive and the courts are bound by law ('Gesetz und
Recht')." CURIFE, supra note 245, at 116.
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but vagueness with respect to the language used in the Basic Law on this point
has left the door open for the judiciary to level the playing field if not seize the
advantage. 278 A controversial interpretation of the language of Article 20.3,
leading to the creation of a kind of common law-making authority for the
courts, was not necessary to color the German system as thoroughly
judicialized. 279 The Basic Law itself recognizes, in the myriad and broad
avenues leading to the jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court, the
predominance of that judicial organ, which the Constitution charges with
serving as the Hiter der Verfassung (guardian of the constitution).28 °
In light of the thorough j udicialization of German constitutional/political
culture, it was more than just a tribute when, in the keynote address at the state
ceremony celebrating the Federal Constitutional Court's Fiftieth Anniversary,
Gerhard Casper referred to postwar Germany as the "Karlsruhe Republic,"
claiming that "if cities are to define German republics, then please allow meat least for today and on this occasion-to choose the city of Karlsruhe, where
the Federal Constitutional Court is located .. ,,8 He might have called it the
"Judicialized Republic" instead.2 82
278. Id. ("Just what is meant by 'Recht' in this provision is unclear."). The Federal
Constitutional Court resolved the question to the advantage of the judiciary in the Soraya Case,
BVerfGE 34, 269. David Currie explained:
Recht ... under some circumstances.., could include additional norms derived by
judges from "the constitutional legal order as a whole" and functioning "as a
corrective to the written law." It followed, said the Constitutional Court, that the
judges could fill gaps in the statutes "according to common sense and general
community concepts ofjustice."
Id. at 117-18 (quoting BVerfGE 34, 269 (287)).
279. See generally Volker Krey, Rechtsfindung contralegem als Verfassungsproblem(),
[Finding of Justice Contra Legem as a Constitutional Problemn (Il)] 33 Juristenzeitung [JZ]
361, 378 (1978); Hans-Peter Schneider, Die Gesetzmdef6igkeit der Recht-sprechung [The
Legality of Jurisprudence], 28 Die offentliche Verwaltung [D6V] 443, 452 (1975).
280. See Articles 92-94 GG (dealing with the broad jurisdiction and the composition of the
Federal Constitutional Court); Article 13 BVerfGG (elaborating on the broad jurisdiction of the
Federal Constitutional Court); see also KOMMERS, supra note 217, at 3 ("By contrast,
Germany's Federal Constitutional Court, as guardian of the constitutional order, is a
specialized tribunal empowered to decide only constitutional questions and a limited set of
public law controversies." (emphasis added)).
281. Gerhard Casper, The "KarlsruheRepublic"--Keynote Address at the State Ceremony
Celebratingthe 50th Anniversary of the FederalConstitutionalCourt, 2 GERMAN L. J. 18, 11
(2001), availableat http://www.germanlawjoumal.com (last visited Dec. 4, 2003) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
282. See FRIEDRICH KLEIN, BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT UND RICHTERLICHE BEURTEILUNG
POLITISCHER FRAGEN

15 (1966) ("In derartigen Ftillen wird das Gericht materiell im Bereiche der

Gesetzgebung tatig, greift wie es selbst einmal gesagt hat, die richterliche Gewalt in die
gesetzgeberische Sphare hintlber." ["In those cases in which the Court materially functions in
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2. German Judicializationof Pure Politics
Germany's comprehensive judicialization has not neglected the process by
which election disputes are settled. Article 41 of the Basic Law explicitly
provides for the judicialization of election review and therefore thrusts the
judiciary into the realm of pure politics, after first making a gesture towards the
longstanding German tradition of parliamentary self-regulation:
(1) The scrutiny of elections shall be the responsibility of the Bundestag.
It shall also decide whether a deputy has lost his seat in the Bundestag.
(2) Complaints against such decisions28 3of the Bundestag may be lodged
with the Federal Constitutional Court.
Thus, according to the Article's first sub-part, the Bundestag decides in
the first instance on any disputed election,28 4 but, pursuant to the Article's
second sub-part, the Constitutional Court's shadow looms ominously over this
popularist function. Another example of how complete the process of German
judicialization has run is that German commentators casually disregard the
view that the Court's review authority in this context represents a radical
judicialization of what had long been exclusively a matter of parliamentary
autonomy in Germany. The seminal commentary on parliamentary law and
practice in Germany, for example, summarily concludes that this judicial
intrusion upon parliamentary sovereignty "should not be seen as a restriction of
the Bundestag's autonomy." 285 The most frequently cited critique of the
the political field of law-making, the judicial power overtakes, as the Court once said itself, the
political law-making sphere."] (author's translation)); Sweet, supra note 30, at 191 (charging

the wide-ranging review activity of the court).
283. Art. 41 GG (emphasis added). David Currie remarked this feint towards a popularist
resolution of election disputes: "[The Bundestag] ...resolves disputes respecting the election
of its own members-subject in the last instance to review by the Constitutional Court."
CUrRE, supra note 245, at 112 (emphasis added).
284. Article 41 of the Basic Law only provides for the protection of "objective" electoral
rights and not "subjective" electoral rights. See WOLFGANG SCHREMBER, HANDBUCH DES
WAHLRECHTS ZUM DEUTSCHEN BUNDESTAG (BAND I-KOMMENTAR ZUM BUNDESWAHLGESETZ)

645 (2002) (comprehensive commentary on the Federal Election Act); Morlok, supra note 25 1,
at 883 (noting the limitation of the constitutional protection of electoral rights to "objective"
rights). "Objective" electoral rights refer to the general integrity of an election and thus the
legitimacy of the democratically elected organ of the state. "Subjective" electoral rights refer to
the individual interests of a voter, candidate or elected official inthe electoral process. See, e.g.,
BVerfGE 4, 370 (379) (stating that the consideration of a claim arising out of an electoral
dispute is much more concerned with the certification that the Bundestag was legitimately
constituted.).
285. Jost Pietzcker, Schichten des Parlamentsrechts: Verfassung, Gesetze und
Geschdftsordnung, in

PARLAMENTSRECHT UND PARLAMENTSPRAXIS

[Layers of Parliamentary
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constitutional scheme for reviewing elections flirts with the issue of the
propriety or democratic wisdom of the Court's involvement in the process of
reviewing election disputes, but easily concedes the judicialization of the matter
before moving on to focus on detailed criticism of the provisions of election
review set out by Article 41 and its accompanying procedure. 28 6 Curiously, this
disinterest in the democratic implications of the Court's involvement is set
against the general recognition of the inherently popularist significance of
election review. Gerald Kretschmer concluded that the election review process
the Basic Law provided "contains a plebiscitary element," albeit a plebiscite in
which, ultimately, judges have the final word.287 Martin Morlock also
recognized that "election review, at its foundation, is to be conceived of as a
matter of popular sovereignty," though that sovereignty is ultimately assigned to
the judges of the Constitutional Court.288
The Bundestag, to its credit, has constructed a number of procedural
barriers that serve to minimally limit the supervisory (and judicializing)
influence of the Federal Constitutional Court with respect to the review of
elections. 28 9 And, in its first term, the Federal Constitutional Court
demonstrated a commendable measure of self-restraint when defining its role in
the election review process. The Court found a constitutional complaint aimed
at the Bundestag'srejection of an election review complaint to be inadmissible
because two of the procedural rules for invoking the Court's jurisdiction in
such cases had not been satisfied.29 ° More significantly, the Court decisively
Law: Constitution, Laws andHanding Orders,in PARLIAMENT AND PARLIAMENTARISM] 333,
335 (Hans-Peter Schneider & Wolfgang Zeh eds., 1989) (author's translation). In part, the
Court's involvement in election reviews is a consequence of the initial characterization of
challenges to elections as a Rechiskontrollefunction (essentially, a "legal matter") giving rise to
concerns about the Basic Law's provisions guaranteeing access to legitimately constituted
courts. See SCHREIBER, supra note 284, at 883 (holding that the Election Review is a special
complaint that has to be distinguished from other complaints); Arts. 19.4 and 92 GG. This
reasoning is circular: Were one to characterize the review of elections as essentially a political
matter, these constitutional requirements for judicial involvement would not come into play.
286. See Karl-Heinz Seifert, Gedanken zu einer Reform des Wahlpruifungsrechts,20 DOV
231, 232 (1967) ("[T]he complaint procedure before the BVerfG makes the matter worse rather
than better.") (author's translation).
287. Gerald Kretschmer, Wahiprufung, in PARLAMENTSRECHT UND PARLAMENTSPRAXIS,
supra note 285, at 441, 463 (author's translation).
288. See Morlok, supra note 251, at 883 (noting popular control over election review).
289. See SCHREIBER, supranote 284, at 451,462-63 ("Urn zu verhindern, daB das BverfG
leichtfertig angerufen wird und sich mit vtllig unbegrandeten, querulatorische order
unsachlichen ( .. . ) Beschwerden Einzelner befassen mull." ["In order to prevent the easy,
barely-justified recourse to the Federal Constitutional Court."]) (author's translation).
290. BVerfGE 1, 430 (1952). At issue in the case were two of the statutorily created
procedural rules governing the filing of an election review complaint with the Federal
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held that the procedural barriers the Bundestaghad erected to limit the Court's
involvement in election review cases were constitutional.2 9' Nonetheless, the
Court has had its fair share of opportunities to resolve election 292
disputes
Law.
Basic
the
of
41
Article
by
it
in
vested
authority
the
to
pursuant
The judicialization of election review had also been taking place at the
level of state government. The two-stage model established by the Basic Law,
with initial parliamentary review followed by conclusive judicial review, had
been duplicated in thirteen of the Federal Republic's sixteen Lander (Federal
States) at the time of the Federal Constitutional Court's decision in the Hessen
Election Review Case.293 Hessen, of course, was among the three deviant states
and it was a structure, with its veiled but unequivocal concern for popularist
authority over this highly sensitive sphere of pure politics, that the Federal
Constitutional Court would render impotent with its decision in the Hessen
Election Review Case.
It was not always so. The parliamentary (that is to say, popularist) body
jealously held as its province election review in Germany prior to the birth of
the Federal Republic. The Frankfurt Paulskirche Constitution of 1849, in
Article 112, established that "[e]ach house shall review the legitimacy of its
members and decide on their qualifications to serve. ' ' 294 Even with the
Constitutional Court: a statue of limitations of one month and the requirement that such a
complaint be supported by 100 voters. See §§ 13, 48 BverfGG (establishing these procedural
requirements).
291. BVerfGE 1, 430 (432) (1952) (holding that the procedural requirements for
admissibility of an Election Review complain at the Federal Constitutional Court do not
contravene the Basic Law's guarantee of the right to ajudicial hearing because they have the
impact of focusing the Court's election review competence on violations of objective electoral
rights).
292. Accounting only for the fourth through seventh federal election cycles (1961-1987),
the Federal Constitutional Court considered 22 election review complaints. SCi-IREIBER, supra
note 284, at 463.
293. Franz Josef Jung& Ingo Schon, Die Hessische Wahiprufung nach der Entscheidung
des B VerfG, 34 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR RECHTSPOLITIK 354, 355 n. 17 (2001) (citing HEINRICH LANG,
SUBJEKTIVER RECHTSSCHUTZ IM WAHLPROFUNGSVERFAHREN 47 (1997) (studying the election

review systems employed in the various federal states)).
294. Art. 112 Paulskircherverfassung [Paulskirche Constitution] (author's translation); see
KURT BALL, DAS MATERIELLE WAHLPROFUNGSRECHT 8 (1931) (studying the substantive law on

election review). Ball notes that the constitution of Baden, as early as 1818, similarly
committed election review to the parliament (Art. 41). Id. at 9. The provision is remarkably
close to its parallel in the U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 5: "Each House shall be the
Judge of Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own members.
...
The parliamentary
organ under the Paulskirche Constitution, known as the Nationalversammlung (National
Assembly) considered the legitimacy of an election as a plenary body in only one case and
found the election in one district to be invalid and denied the affected representatives their
qualification to serve in the National Assembly. BALL, supra, at 51.
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restoration of the rule of regional nobles in Germany in 1849, following the
collapse of the Paulskirche revolutionary democratic experiment,295 the rulers
made limited provisions for democratic elections.2 96 In those cases, the
popularist mandate over election review remained the rule.297 The
Reichsverfassung(Imperial Constitution) of 1871, under which Germany found
itself united as a nation state for the first time, did not change this tradition.
Article 27.1 of the 1871 Reichsverfassung provided that: "The Reichstag
[Imperial Parliament] reviews the legitimacy of its members. 2 98 The insistence
of the democrats of the period on the absolute separation of democratic powers
from the competences of the monarch was the primary basis for this clear
commitment of the subject of election review to the parliament.29 9 Another
basis was the reference to the issue in the constitutions of other countries.3 ° In
sum, Germans simply took for granted the popularist nature of the authority to
review elections throughout the pre-Weimar constitutional period, 30 1 reflecting
an understanding of the proper separation of powers in a democratic system that
did not require scholarly or political justification.3 2
An examination of the Weimar Constitution of 1919, enacted after the
revolution transferred all public authority to the people, surprisingly reveals a
295.

See MICHAEL STOLLEIS, PUBLIC LAW IN GERMANY 1800-1914, 248-59 (2001)

(discussing constitutional law during the Revolution of 1848).
296. Id.
297.

See Art. 78 PreuBische Verfassung from 1850 [Prussia Constitution] ("Each chamber

reviews and determines the legitimacy of its members" (author's translation)); Art. 27
Verfassung des Norddeutschen Bundes from 1867 [Northgerman Union Constitution] ("The
Reichstag [Imperial Parliament] reviews and determines the legitimacy of its members."

(author's translation)). BALL, supra note 294, at 9. During the pre-Weimar constitutional period

in Germany only the Constitution of Alsace-Lorraine of 1911, in Article 9, assigned the
responsibility for election review to ajudicial organ. Id. at 10.
298.

Art. 27.1 Reichsverfassung

[Imperial Constitution] ("The Reichstag [Imperial

Parliament] reviews and determines the legitimacy of its members." (author's translation));
BALL, supra note 294, at 9.
299. BALL, supra note 294, at 95.
300.

Id. at 96; see Kretschmer, supra note 287, at 441, 445. Kretschmer notes that the

issue of election review was first made a matter of constitutional law in the U.S. Constitution
(1787), which unequivocally makes it a competence of Congress. Kretschmer claims that the
treatment of the issue in the U.S. Constitution "was the model for the related terms of the French
Constitution of 1789." Id. (author's translation). These constitutional developments,
Kretschmer notes, were likely influenced by the commitment of the issue to the authority ofthe

English House of Commons from as early as 1571. Id.
301. BALL, supra note 294, at 50 (noting that the National Assembly, which had its seat in

Frankfurt am Main, took for granted that the right to "examine the legitimacy of amember" was
a fundamental right of the parliament" (citation omitted)) (author's translation).
302. Id. at 241.
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significant departure from the exclusively popularist tradition of election
review. Article 31 of the Weimar Constitution substituted a mixed form of
review in the nature of a Wahlpriifungsgericht (Election Review Court),
providing that "an Election Review Court will be established at the Reichstag
[Imperial Parliament]. It will also have jurisdiction over the question whether a
parliamentarian has lost his or her seat."30 3 The character and nature of the
newly created Election Review Court significantly mitigated this apparent,
radical judicialization of election review, which resulted from the Weimar
Constitution's reliance on a "court" rather than the Parliament for resolution of
election disputes. The entity Article 31 created, despite the Constitution's
reference to it as a "court," looked nothing like the unrepresentative and
unaccountable judicial organs that create the democratic risks associated with
judicialization. Instead, the Weimar Election Review Court was predominantly
a popularist institution; for example, Article 31 provided that "[t]he Election
Review Court consists of members of the Reichstag ...and members of the
Reichsverwaltungsgericht[Imperial Administrative Court] ..... The Election
Review Court functions through public, oral proceedings presided over by three
members of the Reichstag and two members of the judiciary."3 °4 In this
combination (three parliamentarians and two judges) the drafters clearly
intended the Weimar Constitution to bring the hoped-for political neutrality and
legal expertise of the judiciary to bear on the review of elections while
nonetheless preserving parliamentary, popularist superiority over the matter.
The heavily divided debate at the Weimar constitutional convention
(Nationalversammlung[National Assembly]) reflected the widely-held anxiety
of any transfer of authority over election review away from the parliament,30 5
even in the symbolic form of the Election Review Court. The fact that the
Weimar constitutional convention itself naturally retained the exclusive
authority to adjudge the qualifications of the participants at the convention
reflected this reticence.30 6 The Convention only approved the proposal for the
Election Review Court after Hugo PreuB, the widely-respected public law
scholar, Interior Minister, and leading framer of the Weimar Constitution,3 7
303.

Art. 31 WVR (author's translation);

BALL,

supra note 294, at 138.

304. Art. 31 WVR (author's translation); BALL, supra note 294, at 138.
305. BALL, supra note 294, at 138 ("Many believed that in so doing the parliament
relinquished an important right.") (author's translation).

306.

Id. at 136.

307.

PreuB is generally regarded as the leading figure in the constitutionalization of the

Weimar Republic: "The Weimar Constitution had no more passionate defender than the person
who drafted it."

Christoph Schoenberger, Introduction to Hugo Preufl, in WEIMAR: A
CRISIS 110 (Arthur J. Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink eds., 2000) (Belinda
Cooper trans., et al. 2000).
JURISPRUDENCE OF
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delivered an impassioned speech in its defense, in which he assured the
convention that the new, mixed form of review did not diminish the rights of
the parliament.3 °8
It was a vast leap from this popularist tradition, however modestly
diminished by the "mixed" review of the Weimar Constitution, to the
thoroughly judicialized process of election review that would emerge under
Article 41 of the Basic Law. Heugo PreuB, in 1919, recognized the extent of
that change during the Weimar constitutional convention at which the delegates
introduced the mixed review of an Election Review Court, rather than Preu3's
preferred absolute judicialization of the matter. PreuB remarked:
For myself, I would find it appropriate to completely assign the issue of
election review to a court. Here, a mixed process is proposed in which
parliamentarians and judges constitute the Election Review Court. In any
event, I consider that to be considerable progress against the current
situation .... 309

The dramatic shift in democratic culture is the product of the desire, both
Allied and German, to develop constitutional structures in postwar Germany
that are responsive to the systemic and cultural weaknesses that made the
National Socialist dictatorship and terror possible. One example of that shift is
the Basic Law's abandonment of popularist mechanisms for resolving election
disputes in favor of Article 41's highly judicialized process. This dynamic,
what Norbert Frei called "postwar [German] democracy's foundational antiNazi consensus, 3 10 gave impetus to the radical judicialization of German
society. Edmund Spevack explained in his survey of the Allied influence on
the drafting of the West German constitution that the key experiences for the
German framers of the Basic Law "were the failure of the Weimar constitution
and the personal experience of the National Socialist dictatorship."31 The
impulse in postwar German constitutional thinking was to react against both
historical experiences.31 This reaction, at least to the degree that the Allies,
308.
309.
290 D).
310.
2002).
311.
312.

supra note 294, at 137.
Id. (author's translation) (citing Drucks d. Nationalversammlung, Verh. Bd. 326, p.
BALL,

NORBERT FREI, ADENAUER'S GERMANY AND THE NAZI PAST xii
EDMUND SPEVACK, ALLIED CONTROL AND GERMAN FREEDOM

(Joel Golb trans.,

252 (2001).

Id. at 253-54. Spevack wrote:

It can certainly be said that the Basic Law built on the memory of Weimar liberal
democracy, and its framers tried consciously to avoid some of the errors of
construction which they recognized in the Weimar Constitution .... For the work
of the Parliamentary Council, as well as for German constitutional drafts in the
period 1940 to 1948 in general, however, there was another historical experience
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and particularly the Americans, dictated it is dependent upon imported
American
constitutional theory-"presidentialism,
federalism, and
judicialism. 3' 13 Spevack has portrayed the expansive jurisdiction of the Federal
Constitutional Court, the primary example ofpostwar German judicialization as
a "reaction to the Nazi period. 3 1 4 The German constitutional law expert Ulrich
Scheuner justified the sweeping authority of the Federal Constitutional Court,
and thus the trend towards judicialization, in these terms: "[The Germans] live
in a country which cannot completely trust itself and has therefore
3 15made the
order."
its
stabilize
to
aiming
court
supreme
a
construct
to
attempt
This judicialization undoubtedly has brought the desired stability to
Germany, which was evident even as the nation negotiated reunification. But it
has also led to the refutation "of the old theory which made a sharp distinction
between legal questions and political questions 3 16 and consequently that:
[P]olitical issues are often formulated in constitutional law terms, so that
the authority and legitimacy of law is invoked to justify and underpin
ideological and partisan aims. Policy is discussed not in terms of
expediency but in terms of constitutionality.

which was just as important as the failed experiment of the Weimar Constitution:
National Socialism. The Nazi era was clearly in the memory of the Germans, and
the majority of those involved in drawing up constitutions has experienced the Nazi
dictatorship first-hand.
Id.

313. Id. at 209 (emphasis added). "[C]ertain central areas of the Basic Law, such as the
concept of... judicial review, were taken over from American constitutional theory and may be
considered American constitutional exports into West German constitutional practice." Id. at
207 (emphasis added).
314. Id. at 234; see WILLIAM E. PATERSON &DAVID SOUTHERN, GOVERNING GERMANY 67
(1991 ) (discussing the effect of the Nazi period on the establishment of the VW constitutional
court). Paterson and Southern stated:
The experience of the Nazi Enabling Law of 24 March 1933, by which the
Reichstag had transferred its powers to the government, also influenced the
Parliamentary Council in favour of establishing a constitutional court. By the
Enabling Law, it was argued, the Weimar system had been legally liquidated. A
constitutional court could not have prevented dictatorship by annulling the law. It
could, however, have mad clear the difference between constitutional amendment
and political revolution.
Id.

315.
(author's

Prozell 21 (1968)
Scheuner,
Diskussionsbeitrag, in
VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT IN DER GEGENWART 834, 838 (Herman Miller ed. 1952)).
316. PATERSON & SOUTHERN, supra note 314, at 73.
HEINZ LAUFER, VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT UND POLTSCHER

translation)

(citing

Ulrich
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With this presentation of political questions in legal terms goes a
widespread reliance on judicial means of resolving disputes rather than on
the political means of bargaining, negotiation and compromise.
The German political system and political culture embody the widespread
conviction not only that public actions should be capable ofjustification by
reference to legal norms but also that the courts are an appropriate
instrument to achieve this conformity. There is a very extensive reliance on
judicial means of resolving contentious issues. The spectrum of judicial
conflict resolution extends from high politics through the field of
employment and covers all matters of ordinary administration and social
provision.
The debates leading to the enactment of Article 41 established that the
judiciary was intended to address the suspicions of popularism in postwar
Germany in direct reaction to the shortcomings of the Weimar Constitution that
made the Nazi dictatorship possible. The first proposal for an election review
provision in the new constitution emphasized parliamentary authority over the
issue, empowered the Parliament to create an election review court (like that
which operated under Art. 31 of the Weimar Constitution), and extended
jurisdiction to the Constitutional Court only if "the validity of the election
' The report to the
remains [after being reviewed by the parliament] disputed."318
constitutional convention concluded, with respect to the proposed article on
election review, that "atleast in the most important cases, as with a challenge3 to
19
the whole election, the Constitutional Court should retain a right of review.
Despite the clear preference for a popularist form of election review in the draft
article and the reference to the limited nature of the Court's jurisdiction in the
report, discussion at the convention quickly shifted to focus on a more
significant role for the Constitutional Court. A representative of the CDU, Dr.
de Chapeaurouge, stressed that "the issue dealt with a political dispute that one
could not entrust to the parliament, which would certainly vote in favor of the
majority."3 2 0 In the event that the issue must remain with the parliament, Dr. de
317.

Id. at 74.

318. Hermann Rechenberg, Artikel41, in Kommentar zum Bonner Grundgesetz, Band V,
(Art. 38-49), 1, 3 (Rudolph Dolzer, Klaus Vogel, & Karin GraB eds., 2003) (citing Art. 51 of
the Herrenschiemseentwurfs [Herrenschiemsee Draft] (detailing the history of the postwar
constitutional convention for West Germany on the subject of election review).
319. Id.
(author's translation) (citing Bericht aber den Verfassungskonvent aufHerrenchiemsee
vom 10. Bis 23. August 1948 des Verfassungsausschusses der MinisterprAsidenten-Konferenz der
westlichen Besatzungszonen [Komrnentierender Teil] 86 (1948)) (emphasis added).
320. See id. at 4 (citing OrganizationausschuB, A.A. Sitzung vom 7 no. 1948 Stan Prot., p.
67) (detailing the history of the postwar constitutional convention for West Germany on the
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Chapeaurouge suggested requiring the political body to act with a qualified
majority.32 ' Others, usually representatives of the CDU and FDP, expressed
this antipopularist anxiety.322 Only a single representative, L6bbe of the SPD,
reflecting on the clear popularist orientation of election review in the German
constitutional tradition, expressed doubts about the need for any judicial role in
election review.3 23 But Dr. Mocke, another social democrat, countered that
point by referring to the election crisis of 1933 that ultimately led to Hitler's
ascension to the Weimar Chancelorship.324 Micke's remark moved the debate
distinctly in the direction ofa judicialized model of election review. The rest of
the discussions focused on style and procedure, but the Constitutional Court's
review authority over the Parliament's election review decisions was settled.325
German judicialization generally, and the judicialization of election review
specifically, have their roots in the postwar constitutional reaction to the
popularist excesses of the Weimar system that made the Nazi dictatorship
possible. These are strong historical justifications for the intrusion of the
judiciary into the sphere of pure politics, a sphere that German
constitutionalism traditionally delegated to the Parliament. The Federal
Constitutional Court's decision in the Hessen Election Review Case reaffirmed
this shift and closed the door on an era of great faith in popularist institutions.
B. America Converging on Germany'sJudicializationof PurePolitics
The Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore represents a no less
significant act ofjudicialization. As with the Federal Constitutional Court in
the Hessen Election Review Case,the Supreme Court chose to intervene in the
election review process in spite of the fact that the Constitution and federal law
clearly required a popularist process for resolving the Florida Electoral College
dispute. There is, however, a significant difference between the two cases:
subject of election review).
321. See id. (detailing the history of the postwar constitutional convention for West
Germany on the subject of election review).
322. See id. (citing OrganizationausschuB, A.A. Sitzung vom 7 no. 1948 Stan Prot, p. 68)

(detailing the history of the postwar constitutional convention for West Germany on the subject
of election review).
323. See id. (detailing the history of the postwar constitutional convention for West
Germany on the subject of election review).
324. See id. at 5 (citing ebenda, p. 75) (detailing the history of the postwar constitutional
convention for West Germany on the subject of election review).
325. See id. (detailing the history of the postwar constitutional convention for West
Germany on the subject of election review).
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There is no similar, obvious historical justification for the judicialization the
Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore accomplished.
1. American JudicializationGenerally
There is a vast literature addressing the evolving, historical role of the
judiciary in the American constitutional polity. It is beyond the scope of this
Article to recapitulate that long and rich tradition. It should suffice to remark
that it is a story that begins with a constitutional provision32 6 creating a
judiciary so anemic in breadth and jurisdictional scope that it inspired
Alexander Hamilton to characterize it in the FederalistPapers as "the least
dangerous" branch.3 27 It was, above all, a republic that the founding fathers
intended to establish.328 Suspicion of unaccountable and unrepresentative
institutions like the judiciary was rife in Philadelphia 329 and was the prevailing
view in the early years of the Republic.330

326.
327.
1961).

328.

U.S. Const. art. Ill.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin F. Wright ed.,
CAROL BERKIN,

A

BRILLIANT SOLUTION

9 (2002) ("Anxious and uncertain, the

convention delegates nevertheless persevered. They brought to bear their political experience,
their sensitivities to legal loopholes, their commitment to representative government.").
329. See SNOWISS, supra note 18, at 38-44 (discussing judicial review at the constitutional
convention); Larry D. Kramer, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REv. 4, 60-74 (2001)
(discussing the making of the Constitution).
330. Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 215, 239-40 (2000) ("[E]ven a limited power of judicial
review remained controversial in the 1780s. At the time, the most that could be said ...was
that courts might exercise review where the legislature unambiguously violated an established
principle of fundamental law."); see Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall
of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv.
237, 251 (2002) (discussing early viewpoints on judicial review). Barkow stated:
In 1976, Justice Chase stated that he would declare an Act of Congress void only
"ina very clear case." Similarly, Justice Paterson stated in 1800 that the Court
should strike only "a clear and unequivocal breach of the constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative application." Courts at the founding recognized and
respected the fact that "it is the duty of legislators as well as judges to consult [the
Constitution] and conform their acts to it, so it should be presumed that all their
acts do conform to it unless the contrary is manifest.
Id. at 251.
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Chief Justice Marshall's declaration 331 of the Supreme Court's exclusive
authority to interpret the Constitution in Marbury v. Madison,332 thereby
imposing judicial review where the Constitution otherwise failed to textually
provide for it, served as an epochal shock to this old conceptual order.
Alexander Bickel, John Hart Ely, Frank Michelman and Mark Tushnet have
convincingly argued that judicialization is counter-majoritarian, especially as it
is achieved through the mechanisms of constitutionalism and judicial review. 33
To varying degrees each of the others agrees with Bickel's conclusion that
"nothing in [the complexities of democracy] can alter the essential reality that
judicial review [a variant of judicialization] is a deviant institution in the
American democracy. 3 34 Without regard to the form of contemporary
democracy to which one refers, from among the possible varieties, 33 it is a
fundamental expectation that in democratic systems policy-making authority
will be vested in popularist institutions,*that is to say, popularly elected and
accountable representatives.336 Judicial review necessarily contradicts that
331. Scholars widely debate the origins of judicial review. See generally Martin S.
Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996); Jack N. Rakove, The
OriginsofJudicialReview: A PleaforNew Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1997); Gordon S.
Wood, The OriginsofJudicialReview Revisited, or How the MarshallCourtMade More Out of
Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 787 (1999).
332. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
333. See BICKEL, supra note 4 1, at 16-23 (discussing the counter-majoritarian force in the
judiciary); ELY, supra note 34, at 1-9 (introducing the tension between majority rule and
judicial review); TUSHNET, supra note 34, at 70-71 (discussing the judiciary's distrust of the
people); Michelman, supra note 5, at 407-10 (discussing the paradox of constitutional
democracy).
334. BICKEL, supra note 41, at 17; see ELY, supra note 34, at 66, 103 ("In a representative
democracy value determinations are to be made by our elected representatives .... [W]e may
grant until we're blue in the face that legislatures aren't wholly democratic, but that isn't going
to make courts more democratic than legislatures."); TUSHNET, supra note 34, at 31, 71 ("A
populist constitutional law rests on acommitment to democracy, a commitment itself embodied
in the Declaration's principles .... The skeptical rejection of populist constitutional law,
however, is powerfully antidemocratic."); Michelman, supranote 10, at 399 ("Do we see some
slight to democracy, some 'Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty,'.. . in unelected judges deciding
the legal validity of the enactments of popular assemblies and thereby effectively ruling the
country?... I am one who does see the difficulty, who tries to take democracy seriously.").
335. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 1 (1956) ("One of the
difficulties one must face at the outset is that there is no democratic theory--there are only
democratic theories.").
336. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 41, at 19 (explaining democratic theory and the electoral
process). Bickel notes:
But nothing can finally depreciate the central function that is assigned in
democratic theory and practice to the electoral process; nor can it be denied that the
policy-making power of representative institutions, born of the electoral process, is
the distinguishing characteristic of the system. Judicial review works counter to
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expectation by extending an ever greater share of policy-making authority to the
unaccountable and unrepresentative judiciary. Judicial review, as a form of
judicialization and as opposed to popularism, is the expression of an
'
and
exaggerated
or opportunistic "form of distrust of the legislature"337
338
politics.

Along with the extensive consideration given to the judicializing
consequences ofjudicial review in American constitutional law, there has also
been concern about judicialization in administrative law. Judge Loren Smith
raised the issue in an article in the Duke Law Journalin 1985, explaining that
"the 'judicialization of the administrative process' is a phrase descriptive of
several related phenomena. It is probably used most often to refer to the active
participation of the courts, through extensive judicial review, in the decisions of
In discussing this phenomenon, Judge Smith
executive bodies. 3 39
characterized the dialectic between 'politics and law as the tension between
"decisions of will" and "decisions of logic" 3 40 and complained that American
administrative law had succumbed to the fallacy that "we can make social and
economic decisions by means of formal [legal/judicial] procedures without the
exercise of political [popularist] will." Judge Smith argued that the surprising
source of much of the judicialization of American administrative law was
legislative branch acquiescence rather than judicial branch selfaggrandizement . 3a4 Legislative vetoes, looking very much like mechanisms to
this characteristic.
Id.; DAHL, supra note 335, at 125 ("1 am inclined to think that the radical democrats who, unlike
Madison, insist upon the decisive importance of the election process in the whole grand strategy
of democracy are essentially correct."); RAWLS, supra note 43, at 195 ("We may begin by
recalling certain elements of a constitutional regime. First of all, the authority to determine
basic social policies resides in a representative body selected for limited terms by and ultimately
accountable to the electorate.").
337. BICKEL, supra note 41, at 21.
338. These commentators approach the judicialization phenomenon through a critique of
judicial review, but they do not say that constitutionalism and judicial review are undemocratic.
Bickel, Ely, Michelman, and Tushnet envisage an altered, more limited or more clearly defined,
role for constitutionalism and judicial review. The point is that constitutionalism and judicial
review, though inherently antipopularist, may serve an important democratic function, especially
in protecting the interests of minorities against the tyranny of the majority. See generally LANI
Wherever the boundary around the
GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY (1994).
democratically permissible antipopularism of constitutionalism and judicial review may lie, it
seems that the judicialization of pure politics is unquestionably located outside it.
339. Loren A. Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight ofAdministrative Law, 34 DUKE L. J.
427, 428 (1985).
340. Id. at 430.
341. Id. at 450. Smith argues:
What is surprising-and, I would argue, counterproductive-is that the recent
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secure the popularist authority of Congress, actually had the opposite effect.
The presence of this check on the exercise of executive authority led Congress
to grant power to the executive in ever more vague terms, inviting at the same
time more judicial scrutiny of these vague mandates. a42 Judge Smith explained:
"Judicial review becomes far more important in defining the direction and
meaning of a statute when that statute sets out vague and possibly selfthat
contradictory mandates to an agency, rather than clear or simple directive
3 43
leave little room for any judicial doubt as to the agency's mission.
Reflecting upon judicialization generally in the United States, Martin
Shapiro concluded: "If any nation is the peculiar home of the expansion of
judicial power, it is the United States. ' 3 "4As an explanation, Shapiro offered,
consistent with the preceding paragraphs, the emergence of constitutional
judicial review, especially as courts have exercised it in the administrative
context. 34' He also argued that American judicialization is a by-product of"the
litigation explosion." 3 " Admittedly difficult to document and comparatively
assess across various societies, Shapiro nonetheless identified a number of
factors that attest to a "litigation explosion" as a contribution to judicialization
in the United States, including shifts in tort doctrine, demographics, American
corporate culture, and the growth in the number and size of large law firms. 347
2. American Judicializationof PurePolitics
For more than 150 years, courts consistently treated questions implicating
democratic structures and processes as political matters outside the competence
of the judiciary. Chief Justice Marshall set the parameters of this preserve in
Marbury v. Madison, the decision universally credited with the emergence of
approach to government decisionmaking adopted by Congress has resulted in the
augmenting of the institutional power of the third branch and, therefore, of those
special interests with the capacity to use the courts to achieve judicially what they
could not obtain politically.
Id.
342.
343.

See id. at 451 (discussing the legislative veto).
Id. at 452.
344. Martin Shapiro, The UnitedStates, in THE GLOBAL EXPANSIONOF JUDICIAL POWER 43,
43 (C. Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder eds., 1995).
345. See id. at 45-54 (discussing the growth ofjudicial review).
346. Id. at 54-56.
347. See id. (discussing briefly the various factors responsible for the "litigation
explosion"). See generally Robert A. Kagan, ConstitutionalLitigation in the United States, in
CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS INCOMPARISON 25 (Ralf Rogowski & Thomas Gawron eds., 2002).
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judicial review and all of its judicializing consequences.3 4' As the Court gave
form to the political question doctrine, it became a matter of settled precedent
that the law of democracy "fall[s] outside the purview of the [unaccountable
and unrepresentative] judiciary" and lies instead with more popularist
institutions. 349 Rachel Barkow discussed a number of the Supreme Court's
cases that established this boundary in her excellent survey of the evolution of
the political question doctrine. 350 The capstone case in this line is Colegrove v.
Green,35 1 in which Justice Frankfurter, along with the oft-cited warning against
judicial involvement in the "political thicket, '0 3 2 convincingly articulated the
popularist justification for so limiting the Court's competence in respect to
questions of democratic structure and process (like Congressional districting
and reapportionment):
Nothing is clearer than that this controversy concerns matters that bring
courts into immediate and active relations with party contests. From the
determination of such issues this Court has traditionally held aloof. It is
hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the
people. And it is not less pernicious if such judicial intervention in an
essentially
political contest be dressed up in the abstract phrases of the
353
law.

All of this changed when the political question doctrine gave way at the
beginning of the 1960s. 35 4 "In the decade between 1959 and 1969, the
Supreme Court, which had addressed relatively few voting rights issues not
directly connected with black disenfranchisement in the preceding half century,
entertained a steady stream of voting rights cases. 355 The Supreme Court's
348. Marburyv. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170(1803)("Questions, in their nature
political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be
made in this court.").
349. Barkow, supra note 330, at 244.
350. See generally id.
351. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
352. Id. at 556.
353. Id. at 553-54.
354. Barkow, supra note 330, at 263-73 (discussing "the beginning of the end" of the
"political question" doctrine).

355. ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 19, at 40. The Court's restraint in all democratic
process cases but those involving black disenfranchisement cannot be urged as an artificial
distinction used to cover the fact that the Court really had frequently intervened in the law of
democracy because the racially discriminatory focus of these cases casts them in the light of
individual rights concerns for which protection by judicial review has proven an effective
democratic mechanism. Barkow, supra note 330, at 242 ("At one end of the spectrum are the
questions on which the political branches are entitled to no deference. This theory of
interpretation makes most sense in cases involving the proper scope of individual rights.").
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intervention on the issue of voting rights was not an isolated exception but
rather occurred alongside the "reapportionment revolution, 3 56 another wave of
cases that "thrust the Supreme Court into one of the most difficult areas of
policing the electoral system ...the structural dimension of proper electoral
opportunity, [leading to] the emergence and application of the, by now wellknown, one-person/one-vote rule. 3 57 At the eye of this storm was the Supreme
Court's decision in Baker v. Carr,358 "perhaps the most profoundly
' 9 The Court
destabilizing opinion in the Supreme Court's history. 35
in Baker
expanded the scope of the doctrine to include not only the "classical"
(separation of powers concerns built into the Constitution's design) but also a
"prudential" (pragmatic, judicial self-restraint) basis for excluding the Court's
competence over a question. 360 This seeming expansion of the doctrine was not
enough, however, to prevent the Court's intervention in that particular
reapportionment dispute, and as a result Baker "actually signaled the beginning
of the end of the prudential political question doctrine. In fact, in the almost
forty years since Baker v. Carrwas decided, a majority of the Court has found
only two issues to present political questions. 3 61 The era of the judicialization
of the law of democracy was fully underway.
The judicializing revolution Baker triggered also exposed the realm of
pure politics to judicial intervention. The Court's first significant excursion
into the field resulted from its refusal to find that the political question doctrine
precluded its review of Representative Adam Clayton Powell's suit seeking
various remedies for harms he suffered upon his exclusion from the Ninetieth
Congress. 362 Following a House investigation that revealed mismanagement
and financial irregularities during Powell's Chairmanship of the House
Committee on Education and Labor in the Eighty-Ninth Congress, the House
sought to exclude Powell upon his re-election to the Ninetieth Congress
pursuant to its constitutional authority to "be the judge of the Elections,
363 Unlike
Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members ....
the Court's
ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 19, at 116.
357. Id.
358. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
359. ISSACHAROFFETAL.,supra note 19, at 134.

356.

360. Barkow, supra note 330, at 253-72 (explaining in detail how the prudential version of
the political question doctrine gradually grew out of interpretive questions associated with the

classical theory).
361. Id. at 267-68.
362. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518-19 (1969) (stating that the case did not
present a "political question").
363. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl.
I.
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forays into the law of democracy over the preceding decade, Powell's case did
not present an abstract question about participation or districting but instead
placed the outcome of a specific, albeit disputed, election in the hands of the
Court. The Court's decision would determine the fate of a particular candidate
for office and, at the same time embrace or reject the constitutional structure
giving priority to the competence of the popularist institution over the matter.
The Court grappled with a detailed historical examination of the meaning of the
term "qualifications" as used in Article I, Section 5 in resolving the first of the
Baker standards for establishing a nonjusticiable political question, namely,
whether there has been a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department." 364 The Court interpreted
Congress's authority to be the judge of its members' "qualifications" in the
most narrow terms, limiting that power only to the review of the "standing
qualifications" outlined in Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution.365 Excluded
from this narrow interpretation of the term "qualification" was the broader
authority of Congress to judge the "fitness" of its members and, more generally,
its authority to serve as the popularist authority in election review matters.366
The Court justified its narrow interpretation of Congress's exclusive authority
pursuant to Article I, Section 5 by invoking the popularist risk that Congress
might use the authority that would arise from a more expansive interpretation to
thwart the will of the electorate.367 Invoking both the commentary of James
Madison and the story of John Wilkes, 368 the Court claimed that its narrow
interpretation honored the Framers' rejection of the possibility that the
right (of the
legislature would have the competence to "usurp the indisputable
3 69
people) to return whom they thought proper to the legislature.
For all the popularist merit of the Court's stated intention of protecting the
electorate from a representative assembly that might seek to insulate itself from
the electorate by refusing to seat disagreeable representatives, the Court ignored
the inherently antipopularist costs of its decision. By exempting Article I,
Section 5 powers from the protection against judicialization the political
question doctrine provided, the Court asserted itself as the proper institution to
364. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
365. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 ("No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty-five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States,
and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.").
366. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 550 ("[I]n judging the qualifications of its members Congress
is limited to the standing qualifications prescribed in the Constitution.").
367. Id. at 533-35.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 535 (internal quotation omitted).
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resolve such wrinkles in the democratic structure and process. In so doing, the
Court substituted the unaccountable and unrepresentative judiciary for the
accountable and representative houses of Congress. The Court also failed to
account for the popularist check the electorate could exercise over such a
Congress run amok: Voting the renegades out of office if push came to shove.
The Court certainly could not have anticipated that it was paving the way
for it to ignore, thirty-one years later, the constitutional and statutory
prerogative of Congress (the popularist prerogative) over presidential election
disputes, such that the Court could essentially select the President just as it had,
in essence, selected Congressman Powell. One must nevertheless read Powell
as clear invitation to the judicialization of pure politics, and one must see Bush
v. Gore as the natural bottom of the slippery slope onto which the Court
wandered in Powell.
The political question doctrine should have precluded the Court's
consideration of Governor Bush's suit challenging the statewide manual
recount of undervote ballots in Florida. "The text of Article 11-as amended by
the Twelfth Amendment-makes clear, then, that Congress plays a vital role in
the election of the President. The House and Senate, respectively, have the
power to cast the deciding ballots in elections. 3 70 One can even read this clear
commitment of the matter to Congress to include Congress's authority to
adjudge the role of the state judiciary in the process. 371 This ought to have been
enough to fulfill the first of Baker's standards 372 and to preclude the Court from
taking the case. But working in the shadow of Powell,the per curiam majority
did not even bother to discuss the political question doctrine, in spite of the
highly politicized nature of the case with which it was confronted in Bush v.
Gore.373
370. Barkow, supranote 330, at 278.
371. Id. at 279 (arguing that "the text of Article II, section I itself appears to give Congress
the ability to determine whether a state judiciary has overstepped its bounds and improperly
interfered with the state legislature's authority under Article II to determine the manner in which
electors are chosen").
372. See supra note 360 and accompanying text (discussing the first of the Baker
standards).
373. Barkow, supra note 330, at 275. Barkow wrote:
To be sure, neither respondent Gore nor respondent Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board relied on the political question doctrine in opposing petitioner
Bush's claim, and the Court was under enormous time pressure to reach a decision.
But neither the absence of full briefing nor the press of time can absolve the Court
of its independent obligation to determine whether it has jurisdiction.
Id.
In support of the conclusion that the Court should have found Bush v. Gore nonjusticiable,
Erwin Chemerinsky noted the Court's invocation, albeit arare example, of the political question
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As persuasive as the political question doctrine argument is, revealing that
at least some of the issues confronting the Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore
clearly fulfilled the criteria for the nonjusticiability and concomitant exclusion
of the Court's intervention in Bush v. Gore, Barkow raised the point in the
context of a broader review of the "fall of the political question doctrine.
In
this light it may be necessary to envision an altogether distinct or new doctrine,
a doctrine of pure politics, which would preclude the Court's meddling in an
outcome specific election context. This might be necessary first because the
Court's political question doctrine jurisprudence, limited as it now is, may
simply be inadequate to the task of checking the spread of judicialization.
More importantly, it might be necessary to conceive of a new doctrine because
the traditional political question doctrine, with the separation of powers as its
chief concern, does not adequately (i.e., directly and explicitly) address the
popularist values at stake in pure politics. The issue there is not the superiority
of one or the other branches, but rather the validation of the rarefied popularist,
republican principles that underlie our entire constitutional democracy. Itjust
so happens that, as between the unaccountable and unrepresentative judiciary
and more popularist institutions like Congress or the Florida legislature, the
popularist institutions are those that can best deliver on those values. Under a
new doctrine of pure politics, assigning priority to those institutions is not
dependent upon an evaluation of their "proper" roles as between separated
powers but upon a practical evaluation of their likelihood to advance a specific
set of popularist values.
These popularist values held sway in the framing of the process by which
the President would be selected. "An evaluation of the historical materials
indicates that the selection of electors was intended to be placed within the
control of the people through their representatives [at the state level]. 3 7' The
courts respected this popularist mandate throughout most of the nation's first
two-hundred years. This was true of the ratification debates 376 and subsequent
presidential election disputes.377
doctrine in another pure politics context. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not
Justiciable,76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1093, 1108-09 (2001) (discussing O'Brien v. Brown, 409

U.S. 1 (1972), in which the Court found that an equal protection challenge to the political
process was nonjusticiable).
374. See generally Barkow, supra note 330.
375. Id. at 281.
376. See id. at 280-81 ("[A]n analysis of the ratification debates shows the framers
intended Congress, not the courts, to play a strong role in resolving disputes over elections.").
377. See id. at 286-95 (discussing the Hayes-Tilden election and other similar disputes and
arguing that Congress and the Supreme Court remained accountable for their roles in the
process).
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The American commitment to popularist resolution of conflict in the realm
of pure politics mirrors Germany's commitment. If one fixes the American
leap tojudicialize this sphere of pure politics to the Supreme Court's decisions
in Baker or Powell, it appears that the American shift occurred some twenty
years after the postwar German break with the popularist priority of the Weimar
period. More important than the question of why the Americans held onto their
popularist commitment a few years longer than the Germans is the question of
why Americans, too, ultimately abandoned it in the 1960s and then with a
vengeance in Bush v. Gore. The question is exacerbated by the glaring absence
of a historical or political shock, like the Nazi trauma in Germany, to justify the
shift. Rather, judicialization of pure politics in the United States seems more
likely a part, and perhaps the final step, of a much broader trend by which the
Supreme Court is aggressively accumulating power for itself on purely
ideological grounds (determined from season to season by the political posture
of the Court at any given time) and not the necessity of history. As Barkow
noted:
In the past few decades, however, the Supreme Court has become
increasingly blind to its limitations as an institution-and, concomitantly, to
the strengths of the political branches-and has focused on Marbury's
grand proclamation of its power without taking that statement in context.
The modem Supreme Court-beginning with the Warren Court, continuing
through the Burger Court, and exponentially gaining strength with the
Rehnquist Court-acknowledges few limits on its power to say what the
law is. While the Warren and Burger Courts used the supremacy rhetoric
of Marbury to advance the Court's position vis-A-vis the states, the
Rehnquist Court has used that language to assert a superior
378 place in the
constitutional order vis-A-vis the other federal branches.
Jamin Raskin offered dramatic evidence of this trend towards ideologically
driven judicial self-aggrandizement, which is nothing more than judicialization
by another name: "In the entire first two centuries of the Constitution's
existence, the Court struck down just 127 federal laws, but between 1987,
when William Rehnquist took over as Chief Justice, and 2002, the Court has
invalidated a remarkable 33 federal enactments."3 79 Since the tenure of Chief
Justice Earl Warren, there has been good cause to accuse the Supreme Court of
"anti-democratic constitutional politics,"38 a trend that has not abated under
Chief Justice Rehnquist. No doubt, the anti-institutional disillusionment
378.
379.

Id, at 301-02.
JAmrN B. RASKIN, OVERRULING DEmocRAcy: THE SUPREME COURT vs. THE AMERICAN

(2003).
380. Id. at 10.
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resulting from the Watergate scandal and the Vietnam War played a part in
weakening the popularist institutions and, considering the heroic role of the
Supreme Court in the Watergate scandal, perhaps strengthening the judicial
branch. But the initial shifts toward thejudicialization of the law of democracy
preceded both these historic triggers. Significantly, the Watergate and Vietnam
War era also saw the credibility and reputation of the Supreme Court suffer
considerably. Decisions like Miranda v. Arizona38 and Roe v. Wade312 just as
thoroughly called the Court's credibility into question.
V. Conclusion
That different constitutional cultures with respect to the role of the
judiciary in settling electoral disputes and, therefore, with respect to the tension
between judicializing and popularist tendencies in the United States and
Germany is nowhere more evident than in the general tone of the scholarly
response to these decisions. German scholars, if they responded at all, 3 a went
about a disciplined and subdued analysis of the constitutional norms at issue in
the Constitutional Court's decision. None remarked the plain fact that the
Court had inserted itself in the political process to finally settle the Hessen state
election and to finally entrench such a role for the judiciary.3 4 Meanwhile,
after more than five hundred United States law professors published a petition
in the press protesting the Supreme Court's intervention in the 2000
Presidential election,38 5 the legitimacy and legality of the Court's intervention
has come to serve as the eye of a still-swirling scholarly storm.386
In spite of the general alarm expressed by the American scholarly
community, 387 the Supreme Court's Bush v. Gore decision constitutes
381. Miranda v. Arizona, 396 U.S. 868 (1969).
382. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
383. As of a search on May 15, 2002 in the German electronic legal database Juris, eleven
(short) law journal articles have been published regarding to the Federal Constitutional Court's
decision in the Hessen Election Review Case.
384. Id.
385. John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, in THE VOTE, supra note 3, at
223,224.
386. As of a search on November 11, 2003 in Westlaw (a search of titles containing the
phrase "Bush v. Gore"), 104 law journal articles have been published regarding the Supreme
Court's decision in Bush v. Gore. A search in Amazon.com as of November 11,2003 reveals a
growing book industry (more than 60 titles) concerned with the Supreme Court's decision in
Bush v. Gore.
387. It is my sense that, even among those who defend the Court's intervention, there are
few (if any) who take that move for granted.
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America's movement in the direction of the heavily judicialized democratic
perspective characteristic of postwar Germany. It is precisely because these
cases were intimately concerned with the "complex interaction between
democratic politics and the formal institutions of state, ' ,3 8 but even more
significantly, the actual outcome of an election and therefore the realm of pure
politics, that they serve as an appropriate measure of any such trend.
Both the German Federal Constitutional Court and the U.S. Supreme
Court strongly emphasized that the desire to discern, promote, and protect the
will of the people, especially as it is uniquely (even preeminently) expressed
through the act of voting, was central to their consideration of the cases. The
Constitutional Court, in defining the gutte Sitten standard, expressed concern
that nothing less than the free and equal formation of the will and intent of the
voters was at stake. Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted, in part,
with the task of determining the constitutionality of Florida's standard for
reviewing an election, that is, to determine the "intent of the voters." What
principle of democracy should be clearer: An election should be an expression
of the voters' will. Both Courts, however, intervened to decide the disputed
elections and, in so doing, thwarted popularist proceedings designed to keep the
review of elections as close as possible to the voters themselves by placing such
reviews in the hands of the people's elected representatives. Both systems
anticipated procedures that incorporated elected representatives in the election
review process. But, both courts found it necessary, although extolling the
virtues and primacy of the will of the people, to take the election review process
(and thereby, the election decision as well) out of the hands of the people's
directly elected representatives and officials. To its credit, the Constitutional
Court addressed this glaring contradiction, at least implicitly, in its explication
of the importance of the fundamental safeguards secured by the doctrine of
separation of powers, including an independent judiciary. The Constitutional
Court explained that the separation of powers requires decisions of law having
enforceable weight to be taken by neutral and independent judges. It cannot be
said, however, that the Constitutional Court expressed any reservations with
respect to asserting itself (and the judiciary generally) into the election review
process, demanding instead that Hessen's State Supreme Court have the final
say in election review matters and not the state's "Election Review Court" with
its directly elected parliamentarians as sitting members. The U.S. Supreme
Court's per curiam majority opinion in Bush v. Gore, on the other hand,
avoided the contradiction and brashly pressed ahead with its intervention in the
Florida election review process.
388.

ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 19, at 1.
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At least the German Constitutional Court could, if ever called to account,
address the judicializing consequences of its Hessen Election Review decision
to the broader commitment to judicializaiton in German jurisprudence that
seems a clear reaction against the popularist excesses of the Weimar era,
excesses directly responsible for the rise of Nazism in Germany. The Supreme
Court, on the other hand, would have to concede that Bush v. Gore represents
the penultimatejudicialization of pure politics with only the shifting ideological
perspective of the Court as the justification.
In either case, however, the message is clear: Make way for the lords of
democracy.

